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1. INTRODUCTION  
Global power structures are experiencing a deep transition, which takes various forms. The 
phenomenon of globalisation is driven by technological development and the demands of key 
economic and financial actors. Their functional logic is not compatible with the Westphalian 
world, which revolves around state power and the notions of sovereignty and territoriality. 
Globalisation, which for many decades was argued to be the dominant force with an ability to 
challenge the key role of the state as the leading actor in world politics, has recently faced a 
powerful return of the state, and the battle about actorness in world politics seems to be far 
from over. 
The forms of global political transition also contradict each other in many respects. When it 
comes to the traditional structures of state power, the Western leadership of the world seems 
to be in decline, with the US political and military hegemony being challenged and global 
power structures evolving towards a more multipolar direction. An increasingly assertive 
China is demonstrating a willingness to consolidate its leadership not only in Asia-Pacific but 
also in Central Asia and many other parts of the world. China, together with other rising pow-
ers, is strengthening its grip on post-war institutions of global governance built on Western 
values. It is a common understanding that the liberal world order, originating in Western po-
litical leadership, is gradually eroding. 
At the same time, however, there are increasing signs of a diffusion of state power – a phe-
nomenon that affects the balance of power between states in a multifaceted manner. It firstly 
involves a growing group of non-state actors challenging state power in very different forms 
and different capacities. It also implies the empowerment of individuals, which is taking on 
stronger dimensions as the new information technologies seem to enable powerful individu-
als, at times, to seize the global agenda and affect the direction of global politics. It has be-
come obvious by now that it is not necessarily the open societies of the Western states that 
are the most vulnerable to the trends of this diffusion of state power. States with more author-
itarian regimes are in some cases even more vulnerable to changing forms of actorness due 
to their poor capacity to tolerate political opposition and alternative forms of power. 
The diffusion of state power and the increasingly complex global power structures challenge 
the existence of global power hierarchies with a more general scope. The idea of a multipolar 
world must thus be understood in a very general sense, with its more detailed meaning de-
termined by issue area. The distinction between the domestic and international spheres is 
becoming even more blurred as the number of non-state actors and actors with a global arena 
is increasing. 
The present report concludes the findings of a multi-annual research project focusing on key 
trends in world politics and their implications for Europe and Finland. To this end, the project 
addresses the transition taking place in the key structures of state power in parallel with the 
diffusion of state power. By first drawing conclusions about the key forms of change taking 
place in the global system of power, the project aims at analysing in particular how the EU 
has been affected by these forms, both in terms of its international actorness and its internal 
rules and cohesion. 
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When it comes to the transition within the system of states, the project focuses on the axis of 
state power considered the most important in terms of its global implications, namely the re-
lationship between the US and China. Different dimensions of this relationship are studied 
with the aim of assessing how the mutual interdependencies are evolving, and what the goals 
of the two actors look like in respect of their own global role. The implications of this power 
transition in the key fields of global governance – also covering the simultaneous diffusion of 
power to non-state actors – forms another relevant topic under review in the global context. 
The study then analyses how the EU contends with these forms of power transition and safe-
guards its own influence in this changing environment. Finally, the project addresses the in-
ternational role and influence of one of the northernmost EU members, Finland. It investigates 
how the changes in the global and regional setting should be understood from the Finnish 
point of view and how Finland should act in order to consolidate its international role in eco-
nomic as well as political terms.  
1.1. Presentation of research questions and key concepts 
The present research project builds on the assumption according to which global power struc-
tures have become increasingly complicated.  
The common perception about two opposing trends, globalisation with the diffusion of state 
power, and the return of geopolitics implying a strengthening of state power, is too simplistic.   
First, there are cases where a state can be empowered by the forces of globalisation. This 
applies to Western powers as well as to emerging powers such as China or Brazil, whose 
economic rise depends on a functioning globalised economy. 
Second, the emergence of non-state actors, usually linked to the dynamics of globalisation, 
does not imply a group of like-minded actors with coherent interests in respect of state power. 
This highly heterogeneous group consists of actors such as powerful intergovernmental or-
ganisations for instance, whose power builds on the strength of its constitutive member states, 
as well as those whose powers depend on declining state power, such as transnational crim-
inal networks or terrorist groups. 
The first assumption of this study consequently has to be that we are living in a world with a 
set of highly diverse actors whose mutual relations differ in character. The concept of a mul-
tiplex world has been used by Amitav Acharya, according to whom the non-state actors chal-
lenging state authority and international security form a highly diverse crowd with complex 
goals and roles. “In many cases the groups are challenging the state; in others they are co-
operating and colluding with state structures; in some, the state is a passive by-stander while 
they fight one another.”1 
The key argument behind theories of a multifaceted structure of world politics is that even if 
states are still the key actors, they are currently far from being the only important actors de-
fining the agenda and outcomes of world politics. Actors ranging from multilateral enterprises 
to intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, international terrorist groups and 
                                                     
1 Acharya 2018a, 15. 
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various types of networks can be equally influential by having even a relatively long-standing 
position in certain cases. 
The emergence of a more heterogeneous structure of actors implies, first and foremost, the 
lack of an overarching power hierarchy. In other words, references to a world of poles, mean-
ing power hierarchies between states in a unipolar, bi- or multipolar world, capture only a part 
of the factual power structures and may even be misleading in their simplicity. According to 
some scholars, one could conclude that the significance of state power varies between differ-
ent fields of international relations. Joseph Nye, for instance, argues that whilst state power 
is still the dominant structure within the field of military power (US hegemony) and economic 
power (multipolar structure), in the rest of the political fields the power structures are much 
more heterogeneous.2 Others, however, take the view that state power is equally exposed to 
the set of different actors throughout the global political agenda. 
The geographical scope of these power structures is also assumed to vary, which compounds 
the complexity. The idea that world politics is organised in line with a set of universal power 
structures is being increasingly challenged in arguments emphasising the different geograph-
ical range of existing power structures. Factors affecting world politics may be regional or 
even local. According to the ongoing discussion about the post-Cold War American hegem-
ony, even this dominant power structure, which is frequently perceived as universal, is argued 
to have had a much more limited scope. John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye, for example, argue 
that American hegemony was never a truly global order, but was rather limited to a group of 
like-minded states, whereas Henry Kissinger points out that no truly global world order has 
ever existed.3 
Hence, when this study addresses the relationship between the US and China as one of the 
key axes of the global balance of power, it is not assumed, however, that the relationship that 
emerges will affect world politics accordingly, irrespective of the more detailed context or pol-
icy field. The concept of a multiplex world means in this respect that the outcomes of power 
relations – even in the most important great-power relationship – are dependent on the overall 
set-up of actors with the more nuanced structure of power resulting from it. 
Before moving onto the presentation of the research questions in more detail, the key con-
cepts behind the present study, and the way the authors understand them, will be addressed 
in the subsections that follow. 
The concept of power 
In very basic terms in the social sciences, power refers to the ability of an actor to get another 
actor to do something it wouldn’t otherwise do.4 According to this conceptualisation, power is 
an attribute an actor possesses, and which works through interactions. This is a concept com-
monly used in the study of international relations when approaching state power through the 
various instruments a state possesses, be they economic, political or military. The balance of 
power between different states is thus usually defined by comparing their key resources. 
As well as the various instruments at a state’s disposal, the manner of affecting an actor in 
international relations also varies based on the distinction between hard power and soft 
                                                     
2 Nye 2015, 97; Ikenberry 2018, 17. 
3 Nye 2015, 11; Ikenberry 2018, 11; Kissinger 2014, 2. 
4 Dahl 1957. 
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power.5 This distinction stems from the level of coercive action involved, as soft power refers 
to an ability to affect an actor without the use of force or coercion. Soft power consequently 
includes the use of positive attraction or persuasion to achieve foreign policy objectives. All 
the above-mentioned instruments may be involved in the exertion of soft power which, how-
ever, tends to revolve around economic, political and even cultural instruments rather than 
military ones. 
Still relying upon the aforementioned concept of power, the use of power in international re-
lations can be divided into different categories based on how direct the use of power between 
different actors is. In the case of the indirect use of power between actors, one often refers to 
the role of formal or informal institutions as intermediaries between the actors. In such cases 
of a more indirect relationship between the actors, the use of power can take the form of 
affecting the rules or agenda of the institutions. 
There is, however, another definition of power crucially different from conceiving of it as work-
ing in an interaction and taking the form of an attribute possessed by an actor. This alternative 
definition approaches power as being constitutive of social actors, thereby seeing it to function 
at a deeper level of social constitution. If the first form of power is understood as power over 
an actor, this second form conceptualises power as power to an actor.6 
In international relations, power can thus be seen to work within those very basic rules and 
norms that are constitutive of actors and their identities and interests. Those who have access 
to these rules and can affect them in one form or another can be seen to have power. Viewed 
in this way, power is working, for instance, in the structures maintaining state sovereignty or 
territoriality, or in the norms shaping state identities and interests in a state-centric or confron-
tational direction. With such a concept of power, it is much more difficult to identify power 
relations, and the set-up of the most powerful actors undoubtedly looks different from that 
brought to the fore by the first concept. 
This report is based on the assumption that power works both in interaction and in social 
construction, so the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. State actors exert power in in-
ternational relations, and are also outcomes of the use of power. Both perspectives need to 
be considered when analysing the complexities of power relations in world politics. 
The concepts of order and governance 
When studying changing power structures in world politics, the concept of international order 
and its relationship with the notion of an international system is also significant. How does the 
present study relate to the ongoing debate about the end of the liberal world order, and how 
should the concept of global governance be defined in relation to the concept of international 
order? 
A good way of describing ‘order’, and distinguishing it from a system or structure, is to define 
it as signalling something purposive.7 According to J. G. Ruggie, orders should be understood 
as the coming together of power and legitimate social purpose, such that these elements are 
fused to project political authority into the international system.8 International orders should 
thus be understood as broad sets of ideas, or ideational structures or narratives rather than 
                                                     
5 Nye 2015. 
6 Wendt 1998, 105. 
7 Duncombe & Dunne 2018, 26. 
8 Ruggie 1982, 380. 
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physical embodiments. According to John Ikenberry, liberal internationalism, for instance, of-
fers a vision of order in which sovereign states – led by liberal democracies – cooperate for 
mutual gain and protection within a loosely rules-based global space.9 Kissinger defines world 
order as the concept held by a region or civilisation about the nature of just arrangements and 
the distribution of power applicable to the entire world.10 
For the purposes of the present study, an international order is therefore understood as having 
a dual relationship with state power. A dominant international order is firstly a reflection of 
global power structures in that it reflects the vision of the just order held by the leading powers. 
The reasons for questioning the liberal world order thus lie in the weakening political and 
military power of the West, and of the US in particular.11 However, as Ikenberry states, inter-
national orders seem, to some extent, to have a life of their own, independent of the power of 
their immediate authors. The liberal international order, for instance, has taken various forms 
in the course of history, with varying direct connections to the US power. 
Secondly, as the vision of a group of states, a particular international order is also supportive 
of the power of its promoters, and hence the liberal world order naturally strengthens the role 
of the Western world. This argument is eloquently defended by Charles A. Kupchan, who 
shows how the nature of different hegemonies reflects not only their material premises but 
also the normative dimensions of order.12 He further argues that normative preferences as 
well as social and cultural orientations affect the character of hegemony and work in tandem 
with material incentives to shape hegemonic rule. Norms informing hegemonic world orders 
are said to be derivative of the hegemon’s own domestic order. They are the sources of order 
and strength in the hegemon (or in the metropole as Kupchan puts it) and are deemed appro-
priate to serve the same function in the international sphere. 
The changing international balance of power studied in this project is therefore important also 
with respect to the transformation of the international order. One of the main questions ad-
dressed in this study is consequently how the key tenets of the liberal international order are 
currently viewed by the key actors, and how the diffusion of state power affects its forms and 
universal scope. It is an important question, not least due to the observation made by Kupchan 
according to which a transformation between two international orders can be expected to be 
more peaceful the smaller the ideological distance between the old and new orders. Whilst a 
transformation from a Western into a Chinese order clearly has its risks in this respect, there 
are many things in the current international set-up that function in favour of a regionalisation 
of the system being the next phase after the Western more universalist tendencies.13 This 
would soften the clash between the two different orders and steer the current international 
system towards regional systems of power. 
The concept of global governance refers here to the institutional embodiment of the current 
international order with all the key norms and institutions it entails. As a concept, global gov-
ernance is built on two constitutive ideas. The first is the idea according to which an interna-
tional order consists of cooperation and common rules and norms between the key global 
actors rather than a plain balance of power. And second, that global governance reflects the 
idea of multilateralism according to which institutionalised cooperation between international 
                                                     
9 Ikenberry 2018, 12. 
10 Kissinger 2014, 9. 
11 Ikenberry (2018, 18–19), however, rightly points out that changes in power structures are not the only reason for a particular international order being 
challenged, as the coherence and broader legitimacy of another also affect its political role. 
12 Kupchan 2014, 24–26. 
13 Kupchan 2014, 58–60; Acharya 2018a, 99–131. 
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actors comprises a vast majority of actors affected by the policy field, and not just the most 
powerful ones. Various parts of global governance duly vary when it comes to their more 
specific actor structure, and the extent to which non-state actors are involved. 
Research questions 
The first question to be addressed in this study deals with the key forms of the ongoing global 
transition of power. The first of these key forms deals with the relationship between the two 
most important state actors, China and the US. The question concerns the extent to which 
China is currently able to challenge the US in terms of economic, political and military power 
and, on the other hand, to what extent it aims to do so. The relationship between these two 
leading great powers is approached as one of the most important axes of power globally, with 
implications for the international system at large. In parallel with this study, another study was 
carried out addressing the relationship between China and Russia on the one hand, and the 
US and Russia on the other. Both of these studies have been funded by the Finnish Govern-
ment Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research, and the conclusions of this report will 
draw on both of them. 
Following the conceptual background of the study, changes in power relations between states 
form only a part of the global transition, and hence the forms of the diffusion of state power 
will also be addressed as another important dimension of the ongoing global power transition. 
After shedding light on both of the key forms of power transition at a general level, their effects 
on the current international order with its institutions and governance will be analysed. 
The second research question addresses the implications of the forms of transition for Europe 
and the EU in particular. The way in which the contours of change affect the EU as an actor 
in the international arena will be analysed, as well as its internal rule and cohesion. This part 
of the study assesses the consequences of the trends outlined in the first part, starting with 
the EU as a whole, and subsequently by analysing some key fields of its external relations 
and internal policies. The EU’s actorness is approached at a more conceptual level by trying 
to find out how the Union’s hybrid actorness – being itself a mix of state and international 
organisation – has affected its ability to accommodate to the transition. The analysis is then 
extended to the more practical implications in the key policy fields, such as the common se-
curity and defence policy and the Union’s relations with Russia. 
In the final part of the study, the conclusions drawn in the first two parts will be analysed from 
the point of view of Finland and its international position in economic, political and security 
political terms. The key question to be addressed is how the changing global balance of power 
and the more multifaceted set-up of actors and power hierarchies will affect Finland’s possi-
bilities to safeguard its key interests in the international arena. The EU plays a crucial role in 
filtering some of the effects of global change, so the developments on the regional stage will 
form a key pillar of this analysis. 
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2. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
2.1. Introduction 
The early post-Cold War period, in which ideological rifts were deemed to have been over-
come for the benefit of liberalism and democracy, turned out to be temporary rather than ‘the 
end of history’.14 The optimistic prophecies that characterised much of the global economic 
and political thinking in the 1990s indicated a bright future, where economic and political lib-
eralisation would go hand in hand and end up curbing geopolitical rivalry. This vision never-
theless came up against a broad range of challenges, starting from the interventionist policies 
of the 1990s to the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009. The revival of trust in interna-
tional institutions and rules in the 1990s, which was demonstrated, for example, by the crea-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the launch of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, had to slowly yield to the complexities of the new millennium. 
Today, the rules-based international order is increasingly being challenged. The United States 
is no longer in the driver’s seat, and the European Union is struggling with both internal and 
external challenges. The relative decline of the West has opened a window of opportunity for 
major powers seeking to benefit from the situation. China has, along with Russia, been at the 
forefront in challenging the US-dominated liberal international order, and both are keen to 
change the world order so that it better reflects their values and interests. The effects of glob-
alisation have bred contestation at national and local levels in both the South and the North, 
calling into question interdependence and progressivism in favour of identity politics and pro-
tectionism. 
The transition of political power between states has been accompanied by another dominant 
power trajectory, namely the diffusion of power from states to non-state actors. This vertical 
power shift has influenced the global governance agenda, necessitating a multidimensional 
and multilevel approach to global issues. At the same time, the governance of global affairs 
is confronted by the need to adjust to power politics with the rise of alternative powers and 
their priorities at a time that is characterised by a reduced consensus on foundational norms 
for the international community.  
The aims of this chapter are twofold: first, it explores the transitions in power that have oc-
curred at the global level both when it comes to shifts between states, and away from them. 
The former task will be instructed particularly by the rise of China and its relations with the 
United States. Second, the chapter analyses the effects of the aforementioned power trajec-
tories upon global governance from the perspective of contesting agents and developments, 
as well as a number of issue areas.  
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2.2. Transitions of political power 
The relative decline of the West 
The international order is currently witnessing a period of transformation in which the pro-
foundness of the change and the end-results are still open. Two separate but interconnected 
developments have soured the age of liberal internationalism, namely developments within 
the West itself and the rise of non-Western states. The global architecture around multilateral 
institutions, economic openness, security cooperation and democratic solidarity was con-
structed by the West. To a large extent, it has always relied on American leadership, and the 
broader ‘crisis of authority’15 that characterises the international system has deepened even 
further since the election of President Trump. The US administration has been reluctant to 
attest to liberal hallmarks, both rhetorically and in practice, which has led to uncertainty about 
the future of multilateralism, and ultimately the international liberal order itself. 
The ‘America first policy’ has not totally disrupted the international liberal order thus far, but 
the combined effect of single events, such as the withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the UN Hu-
man Rights Council point to the fact that the international liberal order is in the descendant. 
The significance of the United States is noticeable even in its retreat, as its non-participation 
in global politics and economics is a crucial determinant of the global order.16  
The challenges faced by the international liberal order are broader than the retreat of the US. 
Democracy is weakening globally as there is widespread decline in political and civil liberties 
around the world.17 Traditional democracy champions are not maintaining standards; prom-
ising developments in some states, such as Turkey, Poland and Myanmar have deteriorated; 
and autocratic states with Russia in the vanguard have taken advantage of the system failure 
through methods such as disinformation campaigns, as well as cultural and financial ties with 
far-right parties.18 Europe is struggling with Brexit, the rise of far-right parties, migration, and 
the consolidation of populist leaders in several member states. The presumption is that the 
waning of the Anglo-American-dominated world order and the respective rise of the rest will 
profoundly change liberal internationalism, or even pave the way for illiberalism, as the design 
of a future world order remains uncluttered.19 
China’s model: from economic to global power 
China has replaced Russia as the prime contender for US power at the international level. 
This rise is based on China’s indisputable economic power. It constitutes the second largest 
economy in the world after the United States, and it has been one of the foremost beneficiaries 
of globalisation, which has enabled it to greatly alleviate widespread poverty in only a few 
decades. After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Chinese 
exports have increased almost tenfold in 15 years, making it the biggest exporting country.20 
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The Chinese model of development, which unlike the liberal model is not based on a combi-
nation of economic and political liberalisation but on restricted capitalism accompanied by 
political suppression, has duly proven highly successful. 
 
Figure 1: Goods export from Japan, Germany, US and China 1995-2017  
 
Source: Nordea and Macrobond 
 
China uses its economic weight to connect with the world, and its importance as an external 
funder is increasing. It has lent a total of more than 350 billion USD between 2000 and 2014, 
and its infrastructure loans in particular have created dependencies in many regions of the 
world, but with fewer political conditions than loans from the IMF or the World Bank. The level 
of debt owed to China is so high at times that countries are unable to repay the loans, which 
China then exploits in other ways, such as writing off debt for strategic concessions. One 
example of this ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is Sri Lanka, whose debt to China was so extensive that 
it handed over Hambantota Port – a strategically situated port at the intersection of multiple 
trading routes – to the Chinese for 99 years. East African Djibouti represents a similar case, 
where China is predicted to take over the country’s main port due to unpaid debts.  
The lending function has been institutionalised in the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), both of which finance devel-
opment and infrastructure projects. The creation of new international financial institutions has 
been complemented by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, formerly known as One Belt, 
One Road [OBOR]), which aims to increase the connectivity between Europe and Asia, both 
via land and sea. Over 80 countries and international organisations have signed agreements 
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under the initiative, displaying increasing willingness to participate in the BRI, despite the ini-
tiative being China’s most publicised tool for outward power projection.21   
Yet, at this stage, China is neither able nor willing to become the “leading economic power by 
default”.22 China’s commitment to open markets is ambiguous as it advances free trade when 
it comes to its exports, while restricting the access of imports to Chinese markets. The growing 
rate of China’s self-sufficiency in production, as well as its hesitance towards allowing inter-
national investments in certain sectors, leaves other countries less likely to benefit from its 
economic growth.23 China clearly places its own financial security ahead of international fi-
nancial stability as it constitutes a crucial element of its domestic political stability.24  
Another salient feature of Chinese economic power is the strong interdependence between 
China and the United States. Over 7% of US debt is owed to Chinese creditors, and American 
companies have ploughed huge investments into China, which has led not only to increased 
financing and export channels, but to greater Chinese productivity due to technological spill-
over inside China.25 Despite the tight economic links between the two biggest economies in 
the world, the unbalanced trade in combination with prospects of slowing growth in world trade 
has caused fractures in the trade relations between China and the US, resulting in the impo-
sition of mutual trade restrictions verging on a full-blown trade war. 
China’s economic leverage is reflected in its political ambitions and influence at the global 
level. The country does not shy away from admitting that it seeks to establish itself as one of 
the world’s leading powers by 2049 “in terms of composite national strength and international 
influence”.26 It is noteworthy that China does not seek to replace US hegemony with its own, 
but rather to create an international system in which its values and interests are better taken 
into account.27  
The path towards great-power status also requires military capability, as this element of power 
has traditionally constituted one of the hallmarks of great-power standing. The trend in military 
power increasingly suggests that China is the closest in potentially becoming the peer com-
petitor of the United States also in military terms in the long run.28 China’s economic growth 
has allowed it to continuously increase its military spending during the last twenty years,29 
and it rates second in the world after the United States in military expenditure. However, in 
absolute terms, the gap in military expenditure and the existing arsenal (including nuclear 
weapons) is still extremely wide in the US’s favour.  
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Figure 2: China’s military expenditure 2008-2017, bn USD 
 
Figures are SIPRI estimates, in USD at constant 2016 prices and exchange rates. Source: SIPRI, Data for all countries 1988-2017 in constant 2016 USD 
 
The modernisation of China’s armed forces has proceeded faster than expected due to de-
fence cooperation with Russia, as well as development of the domestic defence industry.30 
This is visible, for instance, in China’s naval powers, in which the country has made huge 
investments during recent years. The country’s naval powers have traditionally been consid-
ered weak as China lacks ‘a blue-water navy’,31 namely a maritime force that is capable of 
operating in the deep waters of open oceans, and which is paramount when it comes to dis-
playing credible power in distant seas. Lately China has, however, demonstrated robust naval 
power in maritime parades and exercises in the South China Sea and beyond. The im-
portance of maritime power stems from Chinese commercial interests in securing shipping 
lines,32 but is also due to energy security, territorial claims, foreign policy and the projection 
of regional leadership.33  
Although the rise in military expenditure can be explained in part by international missions to 
protect maritime rights, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts, the bulk of the expendi-
ture has been devoted to developing an army with increasing capabilities, also offensively.34 
What is more, the official Xi Jinping military development doctrine is geared towards turning 
the People’s Liberation Army into a “world-class force” by 2050.35 The message from Beijing 
is clear: China is increasingly militarily influential, a fact that chimes with the country’s aim to 
become a leading global power within the next few decades. The military strategy stresses 
regional dominance, however, rather than global dominance. The South China Sea is the 
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arena where China has sought to effectively challenge US dominance by, for example, ques-
tioning freedom of navigation and strengthening its territorial claims.36 Its military capabilities 
are nonetheless moving in the direction of a global power projection.37 
There are nevertheless factors that downplay the role of China in becoming a leading world 
power. One such feature is China’s non-alliance policy. It has few close partnerships, and the 
country lacks strategic support on a par with the US, which has over 60 treaty-based alliances. 
A world leader requires alliances with other states and institutions in order to advance broader 
geopolitical visions,38 but many countries in the region see China as a threat rather than an 
ally to be supported. The long-standing Chinese position nonetheless rejects the importance 
of allies, and the country has pursued a policy of strategic partnerships instead. The aim of 
these partnerships is to build mutual trust and co-operation, focusing on converging interests 
and win-win situations.39 Since the end of the Cold War, China has employed the strategic 
partnership policy with an increasing range of states in the world in order to secure Chinese 
core interests and to foster a more China-friendly international environment.  
But there are limits to partnership diplomacy; it has not been considered an adequate tool in 
managing the diplomatic relations of a major power striving to become great.40 As a result, 
the non-alliance policy has increasingly been questioned and there are signs of deeper coop-
eration with some countries. For example, although it is unlikely that China’s relationship with 
Russia would eventually transform into a real military alliance, China’s strategic partnership 
with Russia is the most comprehensive and includes a general plan for bilateral military co-
operation.41 The global ramifications of this bilateral cooperation remain limited, however. 
A second conspicuous stumbling block on China’s route to becoming a global power is the 
country’s internal, autocratic model, which stands in clear opposition to the liberal and open 
West. The decision taken during the Communist party conference in 2017 to abolish the two-
term limit on the presidency, effectively keeping Xi Jinping in power indefinitely, has generated 
scepticism among Western states towards the Chinese model. As an authoritarian state, 
China struggles with soft power; its political system is considered unattractive, in addition to 
which its concepts and ideas are difficult to grasp for Western societies.42 Still, China’s inter-
national appeal is in the ascendant. For example, China is challenging the position of the 
United States as the most influential and popular development model in Africa,43 and global 
attitudes are also demonstrating a shift in popularity from the US to China.44 In 2017, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping declared in his speech for the first time that the great national transformation 
based on socialism with Chinese characteristics may constitute a path to modernisation for 
other developing states as well. Although this was not an official endorsement of the export 
of its political model, China seems to have abandoned its low-profile policy of self-promotion. 
Chinese strategies towards a multipolar world 
China’s role in the world order is evolving and different understandings prevail over whether 
the country is aiming for a retention of the status quo or a revision of the international system. 
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What is nonetheless clear is the occurrence of a foreign policy shift in China: President Xi 
Jinping has taken the country from its policy of ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguangyanghui) to 
increasing proactivity with an explicit ‘striving for achievement’ (fenfayouwei).45 The stated 
aim of national rejuvenation is, according to President Xi Jinping’s speech in October 2017, 
to first achieve socialist modernisation, followed by making China a leading global power by 
the time of the centennial of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.  
China’s continuous development still requires a stable international environment, particularly 
where other major powers are concerned.46 Its further development is thus grounded in 
greater international participation in international institutions, as noted by former President Hu 
Jintao in 2007 when he stated: “China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world”.47 
In recent years, China has indeed expressed its preparedness to ‘participate more proactively’ 
in reshaping global governance and resolving international crises. It appears willing to take 
the lead in a number of issues, such as climate change and free trade. To this end, China has 
employed a dual strategy in its pursuit of becoming a global power. On the one hand, it has 
activated itself within the existing international institutions, and sought to create alternative 
institutions of governance marked by Chinese dominance, on the other. This so-called ‘pick-
and-choose’ strategy has been condoned by the West, with some states even seeking to 
participate in Chinese governance institutions. 
China has traditionally been apprehensive about international institutions because they have 
been unhelpful, or even hostile towards its agenda and goals. In recent years, it has reversed 
its position, however, and activated itself in the UN by actively contributing to international 
peacekeeping, for example. It is the second largest contributor to the UN budget after the US, 
and the political momentum has led China to push its own agenda in the global organisation 
harder than before. The establishment of new international institutions has also been pivotal 
for China. In the field of international economic governance, China has established the AIIB, 
and the New Development Bank together with the BRICS. In addition to economic reasons, 
such as gaps in Asian infrastructure investment, the institutions project Chinese power and 
the country’s search for more influence in international economic governance as changes 
within the Bretton Woods organisations have been slow. In the field of security, China has 
elevated the role of the old Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building platform in 
Asia (CICA), which indicates the country’s desire to dominate the security dialogue as well as 
to keep security co-operation in the hands of “Asians themselves”.48 This reinvigoration of an 
old platform can also be seen as a measure of institutional balancing and an act directly chal-
lenging the US-dominated security order in the region.49   
Power competition and contested global leadership 
The United States and China are the two most significant states in the international system.50 
But the future of global leadership is not only dependent on Chinese foreign policy. What the 
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US does and how it reacts to China plays an equally important role, especially as it has be-
come clearer during recent years that China is on a fast track towards becoming the global 
peer competitor of the US in many dimensions of power, despite predictions to the contrary.51 
The United States recognises that China is the other most influential country in the world. Its 
strategy towards China is nevertheless torn; on the one hand, it wishes to keep the door to 
Chinese markets open but, on the other hand, this openness should not allow China to 
strengthen its global position to such an extent that it replaces the US-dominated international 
order.52 The US has long upheld a policy of continuity where it has sought to embrace China 
within international multilateral institutions, while at the same time strengthening its own po-
sition in East Asia in order to limit Chinese expansion. This so-called constructive engagement 
approach was aimed at the two countries sharing responsibility for global governance. The 
Obama administration even launched the concept of G-2, which China nonetheless failed to 
embrace.53  
With the Trump administration, the US policy on China has changed from strategic optimism 
to strategic pessimism.54 China is increasingly seen as a revisionist power and a ‘strategic 
competitor’,55 as Washington recognises that China, together with Russia, now poses a threat 
to US interests.56 The predominant dangers are China’s autocratic model of governance, 
which threatens democratic governance around the world, and the modernisation of the Chi-
nese military, which according to the US can take place only at the expense of the sovereignty 
of other states in the region. 
Despite some inconsistencies in the US position on China, it appears clear that the US is 
reluctant to cede its own power through institutional reform in international organisations.57 
Similarly, the US has resisted Chinese alternative institutions, such as the AIIB. The US is still 
the most important country in military, economic and political terms, but its recent hesitancy 
to back the rules-based order effectively calls into question its desire to be the foremost global 
power. As Europe seems unable to persuade the Trump administration of the benefits of mul-
tilateralism, China, Russia and India are seizing the opportunity to demonstrate leadership as 
the US seems to be abdicating its global leadership role bit by bit,58 leaving the EU to assume 
the mantle of “the sole liberal idealist”.59  
The future of global governance will increasingly rest with states other than the US, which 
means that they need to step up to the plate to manage global problems. While the transat-
lantic relationship is experiencing difficulties, the Sino-Russian relationship is deepening and 
is poised to fill the leadership gap. But it remains to be seen which actors, if any, are capable 
of making use of the relinquished power; the disunity of rising powers may well hinder them 
from replacing the US as global leaders or acting together with it, and the EU seems hesitant 
to carry the torch for the international liberal order. As a result, the multipolar world may turn 
out to be truly multipolar, a world in which no single power wants to take the lead.60 
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2.3. Diffusion of power 
The rise of non-state actors 
The competition for power exceeds nation states, and there are more players dealing with 
issues at the global level than before. Globalisation, privatisation and the fragmentation of 
states have all brought to the fore a number of actors that are detached from the state, but 
that still affect international affairs.61 These non-state actors may operate at the sub- or su-
pranational level, but they have all been empowered by the loss of national power, as well as 
the information revolution.62 Technological advancement and decreased costs of computing 
and communication have lowered the threshold for engaging in world politics.63 The challeng-
ing effect of non-state actors upon the state-centric world order is widely accepted, but the 
degree to which actors beyond states are complementing or replacing the state-centric inter-
national order remains contentious. Either way, a qualitative shift in actorness has occurred; 
non-state actors no longer remain outsiders to global politics, and concomitantly states exer-
cise less control over world affairs. 
The range of non-state actors defies neat categorisation, and they may be classified in terms 
of their means and motives in international politics, based upon their ties with the state, or on 
the basis of their impact in specific issue areas, such as climate change or human rights. 
There are longstanding non-state actors that have amplified numerically or regained im-
portance, but new groupings have also emerged. Transnational corporations, religious move-
ments and civil society organisations belong to the former category, whereas more loosely 
structured network organisations, such as terrorist or criminal organisations, are characteristic 
of the new information era. In addition, epistemic communities, intergovernmental organisa-
tions, insurgent movements, global cities and even individuals are a resolute part of today’s 
crowded landscape of international players. Their relevance for international relations varies, 
however, “according to size, constituency, formal recognition and political impact”.64 
Much attention in global politics has been devoted to the category of violent non-state actors, 
which includes terrorist and criminal networks and organisations, warlords, militias and para-
military forces, as they have all come to present significant challenges to the nation state, and 
even to a certain degree to the international system. Warlords in Afghanistan, terrorist net-
works such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram or ISIL in the Middle East and Africa, as well as drug 
cartels in Mexico, all pose a significant threat to the state as the leading political unit exercising 
a monopoly over the use of force. They operate in spaces where state governance may be 
absent or lack legitimacy,65 at times with political and military agendas as well as governance 
structures. In spite of the variety of violent non-state actors, they ride on the deficiencies of 
the state as a provider of collective goods, such as security, healthcare and education, which 
in turn may have implications for the international security environment and lead to larger 
geopolitical competition if they align with comparable groups or rogue states.  
But it is not only actors beyond the state that challenge the state-centredness of international 
relations. Different levels of the state are increasingly prominent, as witnessed by California’s 
lead in climate change issues, or the humane role played by sanctuary cities, such as San 
Francisco, that seek to protect all of their residents. The loss of power at the national level 
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has opened the door for sub-state actors in multiple ways, be it constituent units of federal 
states, regions or so-called global cities.66 For example, when states fail to act with respect 
to global problems, global cities go further than trying to influence national foreign policies: 
they directly assume the responsibilities of the state. This is a visible trend in the fight against 
climate change, which has seen networks such as C40 develop, but it also figures in other 
areas, such as human rights. By way of illustration, networks of American cities are seeking 
to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), as the US has failed to ratify the convention thus far. American cities have also 
pledged to follow the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement irrespective of the withdrawal decision 
by the federal state. Transactions between localities can thus create strategic transnational 
networks that partly sidestep nation states.67 Cities and cyberspace have become more con-
crete spaces for social struggles than the national political system, which excludes certain 
individuals and groups from national politics.68 
Diversity in power and its exercise 
Non-state actors have manifested themselves as players in global governance that cannot be 
set aside from decision-making procedures in specific issue areas, irrespective of whether 
they are acting on their own or in collaboration with states. States and international institutions 
rely on non-state actors for expertise, provision of services, compliance monitoring as well as 
stakeholder representation.69 It is generally accepted that non-state actors exercise different 
forms of power, but their authority to preside over fundamental change in global politics is, 
however, still contested.70  
Much of the power that non-state actors exercise is traditionally either decisional or discursive, 
and to a lesser degree regulatory.71 They have the capacity to influence decision-making and 
to change discourses, but to make rules only to a lesser degree. Non-state actors contribute 
to decision-making with their knowledge,72 but they also bring legitimacy, support and repu-
tation to the table, providing that they have access to policy-makers.73 Their leverage varies 
in different policy stages ranging from agenda-setting to norm implementation, but they have 
been crucial in promoting new issues to the international agenda.74 This holds true for several 
issue areas, such as environmental issues, human rights, and disarmament, where examples 
such as the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer can be found, not to mention the adoption of the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court. Non-state actors also play an important role in norm im-
plementation, where civil society organisations in particular act as watchdogs. This monitoring 
function exercised by non-state actors is both important and effective, as governments and 
institutions do not wish to be seen as non-compliant. 
Norm creation has traditionally been the prerogative of states, but the trend towards hybrid 
and even private rule-making is strengthening. Non-state actors, such as corporations or in-
ternational standard-setters, increasingly participate in norm creation, relegating states to the 
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role of law-takers, not law-makers.75 Despite the enormous diversity in private regulation, as 
it covers a continuum from self-regulation to industry-specific standards, it is considered fast 
and effective in comparison to norm-making by states. The diminishing number of multilateral 
conventions in the new millennium also attests to this.76  
The exercise of the various forms of power requires access to decision-makers, which may 
often take more formalised forms than lobbying in the corridors. The role of non-state actors, 
most notably civil society organisations and transnational corporations, may at times be for-
malised into existing intergovernmental structures. Non-state actors may possess voting 
rights, as is the case in the International Labour Organization (ILO), they may have observer 
status or even participatory rights before international organisations, or even directly vindicate 
their rights as is the case with companies before the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The access of non-state actors to international institutions has 
steadily increased from the 1980s onwards,77 reflecting the transnational turn in global gov-
ernance. 
The future of non-state actors in a multipolar world 
The world order is facing two notable developments at the same time, both of which may 
profoundly affect the future governance system, namely the rise of non-Western powers and 
the diffusion of power to non-state actors. Each development is the opposite of the other: one 
serves to strengthen state power in the international system, as many of the rising powers are 
not democracies and stress state sovereignty, while the other moves power away from the 
traditional state activity sphere.78 One of the foremost questions in the operating environment 
of states will then be how this contradiction will play out in world politics. 
The assumption that the rise of autocratic states, such as China and Russia, undermines 
transnational governance and its actors is based on the differing nature of political systems. 
The expectation is that the restricted operating environment will undermine transnational gov-
ernance and its actors,79 whereas liberal democracies that build upon a separation of state 
and society leave space for transnational relations among non-state actors.80 For example, 
experience shows that in the UN human rights machinery, China has pursued policies aimed 
at excluding civil society from resolutions, as well as harassed and ousted members of civil 
society from participation in human rights monitoring. The civil society space is also   shrinking 
more generally worldwide; governments in all regions are increasingly resorting to legal and 
administrative measures in order to weaken and discredit civil society organisations.  
However, the re-strengthening of states cannot undo the power diffusion, which has widened 
and deepened in recent years. New forms of governance and sites of authority are emerging 
because of dissatisfaction with existing structures and actors.81 State-based solutions are 
simply unable to be specific and effective enough. The functional logic thus supports the prev-
alence and breadth of non-state actors in world politics; they are capable of bringing some-
thing to the table that states fail to do. As a result, the world order will continue to consist of 
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“two worlds of world politics”, namely one interstate system, whose epitome is states, and 
another multi-centric system composed of diverse collectives and authorities.82   
The fact that power is eluding nation states has triggered claims that the state is disaggregat-
ing from fragmented decision-making,83 or that the state has outlived its role in making the 
world function.84 However, theories and practices of global interaction are changing in ways 
whereby the power shifts are not construed as a ‘zero-sum game’ where one actor replaces 
another.85 Innovative and hybrid governance frameworks have been created that seek to di-
minish the dichotomy between states and non-state actors.86 The state may not disappear as 
such, but its operative logic is changing. The different functional parts of the state, such as 
courts and legislative bodies, are assuming more responsibilities and connecting with their 
counterparts abroad, duly creating issue-specific transnational networks.87 Another embodi-
ment of the reinvention of the state is the increasing importance of public-private partnerships, 
which also features at the global level, especially in issues of health and the environment. 
This hybrid form of authority points to collaborative governance between public and non-state 
actors, the aim of which is to recast the intergovernmental system in order to produce out-
come-oriented collective action with non-state actors that extends beyond lobbying or consul-
tation.88 There are also ideas about global interaction that combine the heightened importance 
of new actors, such as cities, with the crucial role of technology by declaring connectivity as 
the new paradigm for ordering.89      
2.4. Global governance 
The complexities of global governance 
Global governance refers to the collective management of shared problems at the interna-
tional level. It is an ongoing process involving both public and private actors, through which 
diverse interests are being accommodated either in formal or informal arrangements.90 It com-
prises all governance-related activities, rules and mechanisms that exist at different levels.91 
Hence, global governance is not equivalent to top-down-level hierarchical authority; rather, it 
is characterised by the lack of world government, as ‘governance’ indicates that a state-based 
approach is insufficient for solving global problems.92 ‘Global’ here should be understood as 
multi-scalar; it takes place not only at the global level, but also at the national and sub-national 
level.93 Global governance thus challenges the state-based international system in terms of 
actorness and arenas as well as forms for resolving collective problems. 
The main distinctive feature of global governance is the proliferation of actors capable of hav-
ing a say in resolving collective problems transnationally.94 Next to states, there are a range 
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of actors that influence not only what is governed, but also how and where.95 These non-state 
actors include traditional international organisations, but more notably different forms of non-
state authority, such as transnational corporations, non-governmental organisations, industry 
associations, and international experts and epistemic communities. Their rise indicates that 
state-based solutions to collective problems are inadequate, and that governance can be 
handled more efficiently in alternative fora and through other mechanisms. To this end, a 
parallel development is the emergence of new forms and fora of governance in conjunction 
with the proliferation of non-state actors.96 
In addition to traditional intergovernmental organisations, new forms of international and 
global cooperation are proliferating. Formal international organisations have been slow to 
adapt to the ongoing power shifts, in addition to which they have been inefficient in managing 
global problems.97 To overcome these problems, states and other actors have resorted to 
informal organisations and networks, such as the G20 or BRICS. Diversification and informal-
ity have also spread to law-making processes, which feature soft law, industry standards and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. Consequently, the range of actors that participate in global norm-
making is broadening, and the distinction between law and non-law is becoming blurred. The 
demands for effective governance have also generated new spaces for governance beyond 
the territorial state, where functional logic drives new coalitions of actors and interests.98 
Another defining characteristic of global governance is the constant increase in governance 
problems and their level of severity. New policy issues are emerging on the international 
agenda and international cooperation is needed on various topics relating to the protection of 
global commons, such as outer space, cyber space, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, the 
maritime domain, and the Arctic.99 Yet institutions have not been able to adapt to these new 
challenges. Another feature complicating the governance of global problems is their intercon-
nectedness, where one problem exacerbates another. Conflicts generate migration and dis-
eases; climate change causes famine and instability, which in turn breeds conflict. The ur-
gency of global problems has also intensified in recent years. Climate change, for instance, 
affects the survival of the whole planet, as may the use of weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. Pandemics also threaten populations world-
wide, and the lack of regulation on artificial intelligence is said to pose a global danger. How-
ever, most of the global problems can only be managed, not resolved as such. 
Besides the inherent complexities of actors, fora and issues of global governance, the weak-
ening of the rules-based international order has further complicated the governance of collec-
tive policy issues. The UN-led network of international organisations as well as international 
rules and norms grounded in political and economic liberalisation, still forms a central part of 
global governance structures,100 but is under considerable pressure. Its central tenets, such 
as the practice of multilateralism and the idea that national interests have been best promoted 
by international cooperation,101 are being called into question. Staunch supporters, such as 
the United States and its European allies, who have traditionally promoted the international 
order and its values, appear divided over its future as the new millennium has gradually ex-
posed the weaknesses of the system. Issues of legitimacy, equity and self-confidence have 
slowly eroded the current order in spite of the fact that no clear competing international system 
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exists.102 Arguably, the Western states pushed liberalisation and their transformative agenda 
too far, generating dissatisfaction not only among rival states, but also among their own elec-
torates.103 
Norms, institutions and agents of contestation 
Global governance is under strain because of its complex nature and many components, but 
also due to uncertain times. Global institutions and the norms they uphold are increasingly 
being challenged from multiple directions and by multiple actors, while strong leaders put their 
“nations and values first”.104 The principal challengers are liberal states themselves, rising 
and resurgent states, regionalism and non-state actors. Yet it seems that while states are 
strengthening there is no concomitant increased commitment to deal with global problems. 
No state can, however, withdraw completely from global issues and developments, and all 
must bear some minimum responsibility for global well-being.105 The extent to which actors 
are prepared to undertake (responsible) governance for the global good remains unclear, 
however. 
States 
To start with, global governance is suffering from the withdrawal of the United States from 
global governance institutions and structures. The main founder and supporter of many global 
institutions is thus creating uncertainties as regards their operation and credibility, if not di-
rectly undermining them. The United States has withdrawn from several international fora and 
multilateral agreements, with President Trump even declaring globalism a threat to the United 
States.106 The US has duly left the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 2015 Paris Climate Agree-
ment, UNESCO, the Human Rights Council, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with 
Iran. The Trump administration has also threatened to withdraw from the WTO system. More-
over, it has denounced the ICC, and plans to leave all treaties giving international courts 
mandate over the US. In line with this declaration, the United States withdrew from the Op-
tional Protocol on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an international legal tool 
the country has itself relied on in defending its own diplomats and embassies.107 Hence, there 
is a clear decline in the US global leadership, and the long-held American suspicion of inter-
national legal institutions and multilateralism as a practice has intensified. 
Although the United States seems to be standing behind its commitments in the security 
sphere, and the real departures in economic and financial governance seem small to date, as 
demonstrated by the conclusion of a renegotiated NAFTA, a waiting game is ongoing.108 How-
ever, the urgency of many governance issues, such as climate change, makes waiting un-
sustainable. Moreover, much of multilateralism relies on the financial support of the United 
States; the country is in absolute terms by far the biggest funding donor to multilateral institu-
tions, the bulk of which goes to the UN system.109 Although the political commitment to multi-
lateralism has already suffered a blow, substantial cuts in funding for multilateral institutions 
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would further jeopardise the bedrock of the international order. Thus far, the United States 
still has “the largest single aggregation of power”,110 and cannot be overlooked.    
There have been states, as well as other actors, that have been willing to step into the breach 
and pick up the pieces after the American withdrawal. Rising and resurgent powers have 
attempted to fill the governance void, which has emerged partly because of the American 
withdrawal, but also because new collective problems have arisen for which no institutions 
and rules ostensibly exist. This complicates global governance not only because of the in-
creased number of actors wishing to participate, but also because these rising actors contest 
(at least some elements of) the current international order. The rising powers nevertheless 
lack a common vision of a prospective world order; many of the BRICS states suffer from 
economic and political distress,111 there are tensions between China and India, while Russia, 
which is less active in global governance than China, seems mostly engaged in creating in-
stability.112 Although rising and resurgent powers do not share a concrete understanding of 
an alternative world order capable of replacing the international liberal order, they find com-
mon ground in their disapproval of liberal values, as well as efforts to weaken state sover-
eignty.113 Another shared factor is the aim to discredit American authority. 
There is seemingly a convergence of interests in global governance and its policy issues 
between China and Russia. Both share a conviction of great-power status and a sense of 
entitlement to a special position in international politics.114 Both states are also members of 
key global institutions and even possess privileged membership, for example, in the UN Se-
curity Council, through which they are able to exercise decision-making power, at least in 
issues of international peace and security. Formally they stress, together with the rest of the 
BRICS, namely India, South Africa and Brazil, the primacy of the UN and the importance of 
international law. This is visible in the fact that both China and Russia allocate their largest 
share of multilateral funding to UN peacekeeping operations.115 Indeed, a noticeable aspect 
of Chinese engagement in the UN is its investment in peacekeeping, which has recently been 
characterised by rapid ascendency. The country has increased its financial and personnel 
support for classic UN peacekeeping operations at times when the United States has declared 
its reductions. In fact, the Chinese contribution in troops to UN peacekeeping has exceeded 
the combined contributions of all of the other P5 members since 2012, including high-risk 
missions such as those in Mali and South Sudan.116  
As regards the Chinese and Russian commitment to the international legal system, the coun-
tries expressly limit themselves to a classic understanding of international law, which is 
grounded in respect for “the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each 
nation”.117 They reject interference in the allegedly domestic affairs of states by criticising 
interventionist policies, be they in the form of condemning resolutions by the Human Rights 
Council, military intervention under the banner of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, or 
judicial intervention under the ICC. The concrete results of their non-interventionist policies 
have been numerous vetoes in the Security Council concerning, for example, Syria and the 
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ousting of the al-Assad regime. Western interpretations of human rights are resolutely re-
jected, and it has even been claimed that China and Russia are fighting a war on human 
rights.118 The sovereigntist agenda is gaining ground again. 
But whereas Russia has bred instability and remained important primarily in the field of arms 
control, China is ultimately the country that is projecting itself as capable of taking over re-
sponsible global leadership.119 In policy issues relating to climate change, free trade and con-
flict resolution, China has declared and demonstrated leadership. The country has gradually 
activated itself within global institutions and especially in the UN; it has increased its partici-
pation in peacekeeping missions, filled top positions, as well as increased its economic lev-
erage in the world organisation with US fund withdrawals. At the same time, its anti-human 
rights project has peaked, which many states seem prepared to disregard in exchange for 
having a new sponsor for international cooperation.120 China is now seen as the “staunchest 
supporter of globalization and the classical liberal idea that trade brings peace and mutual 
prosperity”.121 It is worth noting, however, that although China is the second largest contribu-
tor to the UN’s regular budget as of 2019,122 China and Russia provide per capita financing 
below many small and mid-sized states, and hence lag way behind the US in the overall 
funding scheme of multilateral institutions.123  
China’s divisive track record as regards fundamental components of the international liberal 
order, and international law in particular, can be traced back to its domestic viewpoint on 
private and public law values.124 China has to a large extent adopted Western values when it 
comes to trade, commerce and foreign investment, but when it comes to public law values 
such as sovereignty, authority and social ordering, it takes a different route. This division is 
also visible in international dispute settlement where China has prioritised arbitration over 
third-party dispute settlement in non-commercial issues. Overall, China seems to prefer poli-
tics over law, and bilateralism rather than third-party application of the law. Instead of estab-
lishing institutions and enforcing clear-cut legal rules, China embraces a “highly political, con-
textual and flexible way of ordering international relations”.125 This approach, which has been 
dubbed ‘relational governance’, takes precedence over rules-based governance and West-
ern-based individualism.126     
Regionalism 
Another challenge to global solutions within the current institutional and normative framework 
stems from the rise of regions. Today there are hundreds of regional and sub-regional organ-
isations and networks that play a role in managing transnational affairs. UN peacekeeping, 
for instance, relies heavily on support from regional organisations, most notably the African 
Union. Many of the rising powers, such as Brazil, South Africa, China and Japan, have in-
vested in regional arrangements in order to consolidate their leadership as well as to manage 
their diverse economic and political interests.127 Regionalism has enabled non-Western states 
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to voice their concerns about hegemonic policies in global politics as it provides a more im-
mediate political environment, which is more accessible than global institutions.128 
This trend may be strengthening due to the inability of international institutions to deal ade-
quately with global problems and issues of representation. The slow pace of reform may trig-
ger the creation of alternative international institutions.129 For instance, the delay by the US 
Congress in approving the IMF quotas made Asian states seek regional options. In the same 
vein, the Asian financial crisis of 2008–09 triggered Asian states to seek options outside global 
institutions, which led to the creation of the AIIB and the BRICS bank, whereas in Europe, the 
EU created the financial stability mechanism (FSM). Although the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank has a regional focus, it demonstrates China’s rising power and constitutes in itself 
a counter-hegemonic project.130 For the first time in history, there are international financial 
institutions in which the US does not participate.  
Although regionalism has always formed a crucial and complementary part of the international 
system and global governance,131 it may end up increasingly challenging the coherence and 
stability of the system and its global institutions.132 Trade is one policy issue where regional 
trade agreements have been particularly strong and can even end up undermining the pri-
macy of the global institution of the WTO.133 Another example can be found in global refugee 
governance, where Australia together with its Pacific Islands neighbours, for example, has 
created its own mechanisms for dealing with refugees and migrants. Another debilitating fac-
tor of regionalism is that region-to-region cooperation has not generally been considered ef-
fective in resolving problems of global governance.134 Climate change, for example, illustrates 
how regional approaches are inadequate for managing many global problems. Moreover, re-
gional projects have developed unevenly, which raises concerns about equity for global gov-
ernance.135 It may also give rise to competing regional blocks that increase global fragmen-
tation. 
Non-state actors  
Global governance both thrives on and is affected by the diffusion of power; non-state actors, 
such as corporations and civil society organisations, are an inherent and vital part of global 
governance today, despite their diversity. They do, however, challenge the state-based inter-
national system on several counts mainly by pointing to the undemocratic and illegitimate 
nature of the global governance architecture, but also by demanding more global governance. 
Transnational stakeholders consequently contest the current global governance framework 
both in terms of substance and process.  
The rise of non-state actors and governance institutions has not altered the fact that interna-
tional institutions remain the core sites of global governance. They are important from the 
perspective of bringing together states and non-state actors for regular interaction and infor-
mation exchange.136 It is also within these that non-state actors demand broadened partici-
pation and a more pluralised and inclusive global governance in all policy fields and across 
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all regions, as many global governance institutions lack support from those whom they seek 
to govern.137 Civil society organisations in particular are seen as guarantors of connectivity 
between world society and governance institutions.138 They seek to change global govern-
ance in the direction of more democratic governance by working for more direct citizen in-
volvement.139Although non-state actors such as civil society organisations are not inherently 
legitimate themselves and at times may even seek to delegitimise global governance institu-
tions, their legitimating power is apparent.140 
But non-state actors may not only contest governance institutions and their decision-making 
by focusing on governance forms and processes. They may also initiate change by calling for 
more and increased global governance141 in the form of new regulations or institutions. This 
has been particularly visible in policy fields such as human rights, atrocity crimes and cyber-
space,142 but also within climate change, where non-state actors have been vociferous in 
calling for the intensification of climate action. 
There are also situations in which non-state actors not only act as part of global governance 
networks, but increasingly take on functions and services in environments where govern-
ments or international organisations either will not or cannot operate,143 including the provi-
sion of public goods. The weakening of many states has led to problems in exercising full 
domestic sovereignty in terms of possessing a monopoly over the use of force and being 
capable of enforcing decisions.144 A large number of states have difficulties in enforcing cen-
tral government decisions throughout their national territory, in addition to which the central 
government may be violently challenged. In extreme cases, no state apparatus exists at all. 
Although limited statehood does not affect their status as international legal sovereigns, it 
means that non-state actors may be involved in the provision of goods and security, such as 
clean water, public security and health. 
Besides legitimate actors, such as NGOs, religious movements, or development organisa-
tions, there are also non-legitimate non-state actors that may take advantage of power vacu-
ums or ungoverned spaces, and exercise territorial and political authority over areas where 
the state is weakened. Non-state actors – even violent ones – can at times prove more capa-
ble than the national government when it comes to providing political stability and citizen se-
curity,145 especially in border areas between different states, but also in countries where non-
state actors have traditionally enjoyed considerable power, such as Nigeria. This is noticea-
ble, for example, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, in Somalia, Southern Lebanon 
and Colombia-Ecuador.146 This patently contradicts the international community’s common 
assumption that the provision of public goods should be in the hands of the government be-
cause the exercise of political authority by non-state actors would be inherently bad.147 How-
ever, the current security environment is more complex and nuanced than that, as ISIL, Hez-
bollah and FARC have demonstrated.  
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Private authority is thus both complementing and re-configuring state authority.148 The limits 
of transnationalism should, however, be kept in mind. Non-state actors are hardly able to 
manage geopolitical competition or to resolve climate change, poverty or mass atrocities.149 
There remains no viable alternative model of political organisation to the sovereign state, 
which will maintain its position as the main player in world politics.150 Sovereign power con-
tinues to attract separatist movements worldwide in addition to which both consolidated and 
authoritarian states will guard their turf and limit the ability of non-state actors to have a say 
in addressing global problems. What is nonetheless clear is the need to open up the interna-
tional system to broader representation,151 in order to achieve a more legitimate, if not dem-
ocratic, and accountable governance system.  
Sectoral overviews 
Human rights 
Human rights governance is one of the issue areas in which actorness, formality, and institu-
tional fora have constantly evolved. Multi-stakeholderism is a prevalent feature, and several 
institutional innovations have taken place in recent decades, some of which even embody 
cosmopolitan elements. At the same time, power shifts have markedly affected human rights 
governance, and not always for the better. 
The normative and institutional development in human rights was immense in the 1990s fol-
lowing instances of widespread human rights violations and even genocide. While several 
multilateral conventions were being concluded to protect the rights of vulnerable groups, the 
most notable development was seen in issues of responsibility. The creation of two ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that were built on indi-
vidual criminal responsibility was followed by the adoption of the International Criminal Court 
statute in 1998. This court’s mandate permeated state sovereignty in numerous ways, leaving 
major powers outside of its structures in spite of widespread acceptance by mid-sized and 
small states. There were also other normative innovations taking place at the turn of the new 
millennium that attempted to re-conceptualise state sovereignty, with the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine being articulated and ultimately approved by consensus by all UN member 
states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Soon thereafter, the UN Human Rights 
Council was created to ensure an improved human rights machinery, despite its meagre pol-
icy options limited to naming and shaming.  
The normative and institutional proliferation has been accompanied by the inclusion of non-
state actors in human rights governance in multiple ways. The creation of the Universal Peri-
odic Review at the UN Human Rights Council allows civil society organisations to exercise 
leverage in monitoring state behaviour; the UN Global Compact is a voluntary initiative be-
tween the UN and businesses; and John Ruggie’s UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights of 2011 represent yet another effort to guarantee that universal human rights 
principles do not go unimplemented in a world where power is increasingly being shared be-
tween states and non-state actors. The relevance of private actors for human rights protection 
is also visible in the proliferation of corporate social responsibility, namely private business 
self-regulation. 
                                                     
148 Green 2014. 
149 Plesch & Weiss 2015, 202. 
150 Chatham House 2015, 7. 
151 Ibid., 8. 
  
 
29 
 
This ostensibly greater commitment to human rights across the whole field of actors has, 
however, become a matter of concern partly due to power shifts between states. China and 
other rising states are not only critical of interference in the domestic affairs of states, but  
have more openly challenged existing international human rights law of late by introducing 
their so-called own human rights agenda.152 In addition, China and Russia have sought to 
reduce financing for UN human rights programmes, particularly in peacekeeping missions. 
The withdrawal of the US from the Human Rights Council has further highlighted the negative 
effect of power shifts upon effective human rights protection. The signs of declining commit-
ment to the existing norms and institutions of human rights are accumulating,153 and the future 
of human rights governance structures may be increasingly uncertain. There is an ongoing 
backlash against the expansive human rights agenda, which seeks to dislodge human rights 
from the centre of the international order.154  
Cyberspace and internet governance 
Cyberspace is a relatively new issue area of global governance that has become increasingly 
important and generated fierce controversies, not least due to election tampering and cyberat-
tacks. The regulation of cyberspace is fragmented in the sense that a universal comprehen-
sive regulatory framework is lacking. Instead, governance is marked by different sets of rules, 
institutions and actors that are loosely connected.155 The regime complex includes intergov-
ernmental organisations, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as well 
as general and specific international legal rules, but also corporate decisions, industrial stand-
ards and independent commissions, such as the Global Commission on the stability of cyber-
space. Whereas the technical function of connectivity is rather coherently regulated, the 
broader range of cyber governance issues is not.156 Although a global approach to cyber 
governance would be needed due to the increasing complexity of cyberspace as well as risk 
mitigation, it remains unclear as to what sort of rules should be created and through which 
fora.  
There are many divisions hindering the formation of mutual understanding on cyberspace 
regulation. In fact, internet governance, which forms a central part of cyberspace, reflects 
broader global power struggles.157 Rising states seek to seize more power at the cost of the 
United States, as well as to shift regulation in a sovereignty-based direction where national 
interests reign. The foremost rift exists between liberal and authoritarian approaches to con-
trolling internet content.158 The question of who should control internet regulation – the UN 
specialised agency, ITU, or the more private and multi-stakeholder organ, ICANN – has been 
a central concern. In the 2012 Dubai World Conference on International Telecommunications, 
the Western states lost out to authoritarian and developing states, which posited that regula-
tion should be grounded in state-based politics at ITU in contrast to the market-dominated 
development of the internet and cyberspace.159  
States are faced with the dilemma that while they want to benefit from the internet, their soci-
eties might need to be protected from what flows out of it.160 But equally, the internet may be 
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used for censorship and surveillance.161 For authoritarian states, the desire for state control 
of the internet derives from the need for regime stability. The US and the EU, in particular, are 
worried about Chinese illiberalism spreading to cyberspace. The Great Fire Wall is China’s 
system for exerting control over both internet content and access to it, and China seeks to 
take its so-called cyber sovereignty model global. Many states are signing up to elements of 
the Chinese position, whereas the US is mostly missing in action.162 This heightens the risk 
of the further fragmentation of cyber governance. 
Not only states but also non-state actors are competing for power in managing cyberspace. 
While ideological rivalry exists between states, private actors seem more inclined and able to 
cooperate.163 Indeed, cyberspace governance is to a large degree multi-stakeholder, involv-
ing private corporations as well as new global institutions. This is also reflected in the unique 
feature of ITU, which includes the private sector in decision-making.164 The distinctive char-
acteristics of cyberspace, namely that it transcends territorial and legal boundaries and re-
mains partly controlled by private actors, makes states dependent on cooperative models of 
governance.  
International security 
Security governance is an issue area that is still dominated by states even though non-state 
actors have become important players in the policy field since they both challenge and con-
tribute to international security. Whereas the United States is still by far the foremost military 
power in the world, China’s rise is reflected in its increasing role in conflict resolution. Within 
the primary international security institution, namely the Security Council of the UN, power 
shifts have affected the handling of specific threat situations, but have also created concerns 
about legitimacy. At the same time, the perception of what constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security has constantly expanded, as inter-state wars are increasingly rare and 
civil wars proliferate. In addition, terrorist networks, transnational organised crime and poten-
tial lone wolves pose serious threats to international security, but so do pandemics, the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread human rights violations.165  
When dealing with these threats, international security institutions suffer from great-power 
competition as well as rivalling perceptions of sovereignty and interference. This is evidenced 
by the stalemate in the UN Security Council on the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts, and the 
diplomatic deadlock in the OSCE following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The veto 
rights of the permanent members of the Security Council have effectively hindered interven-
tion measures in conflicts that the great powers have interests in, and which would require 
state sovereignty to be sidestepped. The number of vetoes cast has steadily increased since 
the early 1990s, and in the last ten years the Middle East has divided great powers the most; 
Russia and China have blocked the adoption of resolutions pertaining to Syria, whereas US 
vetoes relate to the Palestinian question.166 The decisions and actions on Syrian chemical 
weapons as well as calls for temporary ceasefires to allow safe passage of humanitarian aid 
nevertheless provide a glimmer of hope.167 
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But in spite of deadlocks in high-politics conflicts, the Security Council continues to play a 
meaningful role in civil conflicts in Africa, which make up the majority of the items on the 
Council’s agenda.168 In particular, China has increased its investment in peacekeeping de-
spite its traditional reluctance to interfere in other states’ affairs either by voting on peace-
keeping resolutions or by financing such operations.169 It provides 2,441 personnel and is the 
second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping.170 Maintaining international stability 
is important for China not only because of soft power projection, but also for economic rea-
sons in keeping trade and commerce routes open.171 Its participation in highly intrusive and 
complex missions nevertheless reveals a contradiction between reality and rhetoric when it 
comes to China’s commitment to the equal sovereignty of states, and non-intervention.172  
The Security Council also plays a key role in the fight against international terrorism173 and 
non-proliferation issues – topics that great powers have so far united on. But systematic and 
widespread human rights violations divide the permanent members, with China and Russia 
rejecting interference in the internal affairs of states. Thus, for example, the Security Council 
has been able to decide on tough sanctions for North Korean regime members in response 
to the country’s nuclearisation and missile testing, whereas it has failed to adopt any 
measures in response to North Korea’s human rights situation. 
Power shifts between states have nevertheless not only affected the handling of thorny con-
flicts threatening international peace and security, they have also highlighted the outdated 
composition of the Security Council. Countries such as Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Germany have strengthened their calls for reform of the Security Council’s compo-
sition in order to expand their power. Saudi Arabia even formally rejected its seat in the UN 
Security Council in 2013 due to the lack of reform. However, neither the working of the Secu-
rity Council, nor the governance of international security more generally, will improve as long 
as the great powers by their own actions disregard or cast doubt on the foundational rules on 
the use of force. The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 has been followed by 
Chinese claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea, and the US bombing of Syria in 
2017 in contravention of international law.174  
Global security governance is complemented by regional organisations that have played an 
important role in conflict resolution. On the one hand, they have urged the Security Council to 
act, while on the other hand, they have been the ones empowered to act on behalf of the 
Council, as was the case, for example, with the African Union in the UN’s mission to Somalia. 
In addition, they may be the most appropriate actors in regional conflicts, as demonstrated by 
the renewed relevance of the OSCE with regard to the Ukraine conflict. Private actors are on 
the rise as security providers as well. Private security and military companies hunt down pi-
rates, protect UN operations, and guard persons and properties even in the theatre of war.175 
As a result, states have been forced to consider how to keep the privatisation of security within 
the boundaries of both national and international law. This has necessitated innovative forms 
of governance, such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers multi-
stakeholder initiative, which is built around the participation of states, private security compa-
nies and civil society organisations. Security governance has become increasingly pluralised 
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as various types of actors besides states not only generate security threats, but also procure 
and provide security.176 
Trade 
Trade is the policy field in which power shifts are most noticeable.177 It is influenced especially 
by tensions between developing and non-developing states, as well as the creation of trade 
agreements that form an alternative to the WTO. The deteriorating US-China relationship af-
fects global trade relations overall and may even imperil the existence of the WTO altogether. 
The greatest beneficiary of globalisation and accession to the WTO has been China, whose 
economic upsurge has made it central to international trade and one of the core powers along 
with the US and the EU. Yet trade relations between the two largest economies in the world, 
namely the US and China, are characterised by disappointment with the fact that Chinese 
membership of the WTO has not changed China’s own market rules to a satisfactory degree. 
The US has accused China of “policies inconsistent with free and fair trade, including tariffs, 
quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft and in-
dustrial subsidies”.178 In response, China is playing by the WTO rulebook, and advancing its 
interests increasingly before the organisation’s dispute settlement bodies, in contrast to the 
Trump administration’s protective and retaliatory measures against China. The WTO remains 
caught in the middle of the trade war between the US and China, which it failed to prevent to 
begin with. US discontent with the organisation’s dispute settlement mechanisms as well as 
the WTO’s incapacity to deal with Chinese subsidies may end up taking the confrontation 
from the multilateral trading system to power politics.179 Whether this will lead to a revision of 
the WTO itself or not remains contested, and strongly rejected by the rising powers. 
But China is not the only rising power challenging the multilateral trade system. Other larger 
states, such as Brazil, Russia and India have become increasingly important due to their mar-
ket sizes, trade volumes and institutional activity.180 Together with several developing states, 
these rising powers have resisted further international regulation on Western priorities related 
to investment, services and intellectual property. Instead, rising powers desire regulation on 
agriculture and other more traditional trade sectors. The disparity between Western states 
and many of the rising powers that reserve a central role for the state in organising the econ-
omy181 is constantly being accentuated. The disagreement over further trade rules impedes 
multilateral trade negotiations and will hamper trade growth in the long run. 
In response, many states, both Western and rising, have sought to conclude free trade agree-
ments (FTA), the increase in which has been exponential.182 In recent years, the trend has 
shifted towards mega FTAs, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). These agreements would enable deepening trade liberalisation rules 
with a large number of countries, ultimately setting trade governance on different tracks. Such 
practices may constitute a threat to the global trade regime and its principles of universalism 
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and non-discrimination.183 The risk of trade governance fragmentation is real despite the im-
mediate preferential trade benefits. 
2.5. Chapter conclusions 
In light of all the political contestation of institutions as well as norms that form the bedrock of 
global governance, it is unsurprising that the international liberal order is said to be in crisis. 
Still, there are factors that increase the current order’s resilience and make it likely that it will 
survive in one form or another. One salient feature of the international liberal order has been 
the high degree of institutionalisation, which has contributed to its longevity.184 The UN, the 
Bretton Woods institutions, and the WTO all comprise the many layers of rules and institutions 
that make it difficult for rising states to overturn the present order. Moreover, the classical 
mechanism of overturning international orders, namely great-power war, seems unlikely due 
to the even distribution of nuclear weapons among the great powers. Additionally, liberal de-
mocracy has spread to such an extent that it is deeply rooted in the global system.185 The 
complexity of the international order makes it difficult for contesting powers to categorically 
reject it; in some issue areas cooperation may be feasible, whereas in others it can more 
easily be opposed.186  
The construction of the new international order will be characterised by pluralisation of 
agency.187 The rise of non-Western states, particularly China, is pivotal for power politics and 
global governance. China is increasingly at the heart of many global problems together with 
the US. In many issues, China has portrayed itself as a protector of Western values, such as 
internet freedom and free trade. What is more, its global leadership efforts gain traction as a 
result of US withdrawal. China uses a policy of diversion by criticising the West for online 
mass surveillance or human rights violations, while its own actions are highly questionable. 
Despite using familiar parlance, China plays by a different playbook and its objectives seem 
to differ from the norm. The world order in which non-Western states hold a more prominent 
place is likely to be more sympathetic to the concerns of developing states, as well as re-
spectful of sovereignty and security,188 as already witnessed in issue areas such as cyber 
governance.  
The implications of China’s rise and the uncertainty surrounding the international order cre-
ated by the Trump-led US are often understood as leading to multi-polarity. Indeed, an in-
creasing number of powerful states are on the rise, pointing to the formation of a multipolar 
world order. A polar world order is nonetheless based on stable and fixed alliances, which 
fails to correspond to the present situation, where power constellations vary and overlap de-
pending on the policy issue.189 Countries are not divided between different bloc-like poles 
where alternative poles are categorically rejected. Instead, “different actors can have legiti-
macy and take leadership in different issue areas”.190 For example, traditional comprehensive 
alliances have weakened, as witnessed by Japan and the United Kingdom joining the AIIB, 
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or the EU seeking global leadership with China in trade and environmental issues. The inter-
national system will be increasingly diffuse and several authorities will be in place.191 The 
power of non-state actors to engage in effective governance also demonstrates that the mul-
tipolar world actually thrives on “multiple sites of authority”.192 Another important site of agency 
in the construction of the new world order will be regionalism, which may both complement 
and fragment the international system.  
For the Western defenders of the international liberal order, this not only means that the com-
mitment to international fora must be increased, but also that one must realise the deep op-
position to interventionist rules and policies that has hitherto been at the heart of the order. 
Norms must be re-evaluated; a choice must be made between resisting or embracing alter-
native approaches to handling collective problems.193 How the Western states deal with con-
testing powers will be of the utmost importance; it should be recognised that all states must 
do their share of global governance irrespective of how the West feels about their interests 
and preferences. To reconcile this conundrum, one needs to accept the differences and com-
promise. The question is to what extent the supporters of the international liberal order should 
adjust their positions, and on what issues compromise is feasible. 
At the international level, re-evaluation and accommodation have already taken place to a 
certain extent. For example, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been geared towards 
capacity-building and international assistance, instead of maintaining its original content 
aimed at enabling international military interventions with humanitarian purposes.194 Western 
states themselves have even turned away from hard-core interventionism. Similarly, expec-
tations about what the ICC can achieve have also become more realistic. What is needed is 
nevertheless a discussion on what a potentially revised world order wants to achieve and by 
what means,195 on top of the issue of who gets to participate in decision-making – even if a 
clear single ordering moment might be missing.196 
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3. THE EU IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHANGING 
GLOBAL ORDER 
3.1. Introduction 
Ongoing shifts in the global distribution of power and uncertainty about the future shape of 
the global order are making it ever more complicated for the European Union and its member 
states to defend their values and interests in the world. At the same time, the EU’s unity is 
more crucial than ever. As competition between major powers, most notably the US and 
China, increasingly dominates global politics, the EU needs to define and pursue a common 
strategy. Unity is also needed in order to counter deliberate efforts by other actors, especially 
Russia and China, to divide Europe. 
External challenges interact with internal ones: increased global uncertainty about the liberal 
order is reflected in the EU’s internal developments. The EU’s ability to define and promote 
its strategic goals in the global arena is weakened by the departure of the UK and increased 
political polarisation in the remaining member states. The rise of populist radical right-wing 
parties in many European states undermines the value basis of the Union and has concrete 
policy implications, having contributed, for example, to the difficulties to formulate a shared 
approach to migration. 
This chapter looks firstly at the EU’s position in the changing global order and its attempts to 
cope with contradictory changes such as the rise of power politics and simultaneous diffusion 
of power. It then turns to major internal challenges and the EU’s responses to these, notably 
the rise of populism, the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis. The third section examines 
some key areas of the EU’s external relations and foreign and security policy, focusing on 
trade policy, defence cooperation and relations with Russia. 
3.2. The EU’s worldview and position in the changing global 
order 
The notion of rules-based order has a central place in the EU’s vision of itself – as formulated 
by Tocci, multilateralism and the rule of law “constitute the very moral and ideational bedrock 
of the European project”.197 The EU has tried to project the same liberal worldview beyond its 
borders, in its neighbourhood and in the world at large. The EU’s view of international order 
is liberal in its emphasis on institutions and shared norms that constrain state behaviour and 
foster cooperation. Furthermore, it is liberal in the sense of relying on respect for freedom, the 
rule of law, and the openness of society and government. Both of these aspects are currently 
under strain due to the rise of non-Western powers and the return of power politics. 
From the post-Cold War era to the return of power politics 
The EU’s international actorness developed rapidly during the post-Cold War era. It was 
shaped by the spread of liberal norms in Europe as well as globally, and a relatively favourable 
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regional security environment. The 1990s was a period without major challenges to the West-
ern US-led hegemony and the liberal political and economic model. The reunification of Eu-
rope was a major strategic goal shared by the EU and the US. In the 1990s, and a good part 
of the 2000s, the EU pursued deepening and widening, built on European norms and values 
as a largely unquestioned ideal. The launch of the Eastern enlargement process, Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (1993) and Common Security and Defence Policy (1999) had a 
strongly value-oriented and idealist flavour. The EU’s agenda was driven by the belief in the 
supremacy and attractiveness of its own model.  
Since the optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has been surrounded by a gradually 
deteriorating security environment, while building up its own security and defence policy in an 
effort to address the growing concerns. The major trends over the last quarter of a century 
have moved the EU from expansion to introversion, from exporting security to importing inse-
curity, from transforming the neighbourhood and even the world to protecting itself, and from 
idealism to pragmatism. In the face of external events often evolving along undesired paths, 
the EU has had to scale down its belief in its own ability to shape developments in its neigh-
bourhood and beyond. The shift towards pragmatism and self-protection has entailed adap-
tation to the revival of the relevance of military power. 
In recent years, the return of geopolitical tensions and the rise of zero-sum competition among 
major powers has made it increasingly difficult, but also more important for the EU to 
strengthen its foreign and security policy. These are particularly challenging developments for 
the EU, which is not well-suited to be a major actor in a world of power politics; indeed, his-
torically, its very purpose has been to tame power politics. The EU is not a state and not a 
major power in the traditional sense, not least due to its very limited ability to project military 
force. The EU’s nature as a unique entity that ‘vacillates between a state identity and that of 
a different actor’ has inspired a rich academic discussion where this uniqueness has been 
seen as a source of both weakness and strength.198 From a realist perspective, it has been 
characterised as a small or medium power.199 
Despite the EU’s efforts to move towards a post-Westphalian or post-sovereign conception of 
external affairs,200 foreign and security policy remains a realm where member states hold onto 
their sovereignty. The common foreign and security policy of the EU is complementary to the 
policies of its individual member states. The EU’s foreign policy performance has often been 
constrained by the lack of political unity, strategic thinking, and common strategic culture.201  
The rise of new actors, notably China, gives increased prominence to (geo)political competi-
tion between major powers along the lines of realist IR theory. World politics seems to be 
moving towards a multipolar order. The global shift to increased great-power competition 
overshadows the possibility for the EU to be a ‘different kind of actor’ in world politics. The 
rising powers, and perhaps increasingly some Western actors as well, uphold rather tradi-
tional understandings of statehood and sovereignty. In order to be able to respond to the 
global tensions and protect its interests, the EU is expected to act, by its partners and its own 
citizens, in a more state-like manner, showing unity and developing the full range of foreign 
policy resources, including military capability. Within the EU, the debate on a post-sovereign 
Europe has been replaced by calls for European sovereignty, portrayed as part of the EU’s 
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response to the new global challenges.202 Yet these calls are not easily accommodated to the 
above-mentioned wish of member states to retain their formal sovereignty, especially in the 
field of foreign and security policy. 
Europe’s internal divisions are exploited and deliberately exacerbated by major powers such 
as Russia and China. While the impact of China is more subtle and largely based on its in-
creasing economic presence in Europe, Russia is intervening more directly via hybrid 
measures such as disinformation and support for radical populist groups, instrumentalising 
existing social and political divisions in order to deepen cleavages within and between EU 
member states. The US has traditionally supported European integration and unity (albeit not 
without disruptions, such as the division into ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe instigated by President 
George W. Bush during the Iraq war). However, the strategic value of a united Europe as an 
ally of the US has been called into question by President Trump. Even before the Trump era, 
there were signs that US attention was increasingly focused on China and Asia, while the 
relevance of Europe was declining.  
Networks, values and resilience 
The state-centric trend of the return of realist geopolitics is challenged by another dimension 
of change: the implosion of connections and diffusion of power. Borders are porous and state 
sovereignty is in many ways an illusion, as we are connected together by flows of people, 
goods, money, data and energy. Expanding networks of actors are enabled by new forms of 
physical connectivity that link together different parts of the world. Some go as far as to argue 
that this makes territories and borders irrelevant203 – a claim that is hard to sustain in light of 
territorial conflicts over Crimea and the South China Sea, to name just a few. Yet it is hard to 
deny that governing has become more difficult, and an increasing variety of actors can shape 
global events.204 States are embedded in webs of interdependencies like never before. The 
chessboard and the web co-exist, as Anne-Marie Slaughter puts it.205  
These two dimensions of change are in conflict with each other, and yet they are simultane-
ously challenging the liberal, rules-based order. The norms and institutions that have regu-
lated international relations since the end of the Second World War are under strain. The 
geopolitical tensions between great powers are not taking us back to the 19th century, but they 
are playing out in new ways in today’s networked world. Europe, among others, is puzzled 
about how to address the new uncertainties and reassess its own place in the world. 
The EU has embraced, at least rhetorically, the global trend of diffusion of power and the 
vision of a less state-centric global order. The idea of global networks that encompass and 
empower various non-state actors seems to make more space for a quasi-state actor such 
as the EU and has indeed been endorsed in the European Global Strategy (EGS). The strat-
egy conveys an explicitly network-based understanding of world politics and the EU’s role in 
it. The EU sets out to act as an “agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within 
a networked web of players”.206 The EU is a network actor by its very nature, with its member 
states and citizens tied together by a uniquely dense web of connections and interdependen-
cies. A great number and broad variety of actors are involved in its policy-making through a 
multi-level system of governance. The EU’s own vision of its place in the world presents this 
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feature of the Union as a ‘unique advantage’ that should enable Europeans to shape global 
developments in the era of an ‘unprecedented degree of global connectivity’ and ‘exponential 
spread of webs’.207  
The EU’s vision of global networks is tied to the values of freedom, openness and the rule of 
law.208 In the EGS, civil society actors are singled out among other partners, and the EU 
makes a commitment to protect and empower human rights defenders in particular. However, 
the EU’s rhetoric on values has acquired a more inward-looking and defensive dimension. 
The EGS stresses ‘adherence to our values’ and the need to ‘foster the resilience’ of democ-
racies in the member states. It rejects the earlier tendency to juxtapose values and interests, 
and formulates the promotion of ‘our values’ globally as an interest of the EU. Although the 
EGS is still a distinctly liberal strategy, the pendulum has swung from outward-looking ideal-
ism in the direction of defensive realism.209  
Upheavals in the neighbourhood, including wars in Libya, Syria and eastern Ukraine, pro-
voked a debate on whether EU foreign policy should become more realist and ‘geopolitical’ 
in order to accommodate to the rise in power politics.210 The EU had often neglected security 
problems in the neighbouring regions, which transformed into direct threats to the Union itself. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy duly shifted from its earlier emphasis on supporting 
transformation (political and economic reforms) and extending European norms and values 
towards increased attention to security.  
The new approach shifts the focus to improving the ‘resilience’ of neighbours and helping 
them build up the necessary capabilities for improving their security. Yet perhaps the change 
is not so radical after all – the continued importance of norms and values is reflected in the 
EU’s understanding of resilience. The EGS claims that a “resilient society featuring democ-
racy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state”. 
The EU continues to shy away from hard security issues in nearby regions and tries to develop 
a distinct approach to regional security, now defined through the notion of resilience. 
Defending the rules-based order 
Globally, the EU has been left as the only major actor still firmly committed to the rules-based 
order. With the declining ability and willingness of the US to sustain international norms and 
institutions, it is not clear who, if anyone, will take on the role of global leadership. Calls for 
Europe (or Germany) to do this have been met with caution and doubt.211 More optimistic 
voices argue that the rising powers may become constructive pillars of a new and different, 
but still rules-based world order.212 Alternatively, the rise of new powers that do not share 
Western understandings of order has given rise to the notion of multipolarity, but also ‘nonpo-
larity’, ‘no one’s world’ or a ‘multi-order world’ – a world without a clear leader or a shared 
order.213  
There is, however, a number of mid-sized powers and smaller actors that share the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism, and that look to Europe for partnership, if not leadership in 
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efforts to preserve and, where necessary, reform the current order. The EU can reach out to 
like-minded countries such as Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea that also have a 
strong interest in preserving global rules on trade, human rights and climate, for instance. To 
some degree, a shared interest in multilateralism can also be found in countries such as India, 
Brazil and South Africa, although these belong to the BRICS group, which aims at counter-
balancing the West. 
Furthermore, the EU can build on its understanding and experience of network agency and 
make a more comprehensive strategic effort to think and act as a network power in a densely 
interconnected world. This means a proactive approach to engaging partners inside and out-
side Europe, including state and non-state actors that share the EU’s interests. Faced with 
the return of great-power competition and exclusive forms of nationalism, the EU should foster 
and make use of open networks, but also defend its key networks and make them more resil-
ient.  
One can distinguish between various types of network strategies, such as networks aimed at 
strengthening one’s own resilience, networks built for carrying out specific tasks, and net-
works developed for addressing large-scale global problems.214 All of these are relevant with 
a view to pursuing the EU’s foreign policy goals, such as countering hybrid threats (a case of 
strengthening resilience), managing conflicts in the neighbourhood (a case of specific tasks) 
or curbing climate change (a prime example of a large-scale global problem). In order to make 
progress in any of these fields, the EU needs to coordinate among a number of actors inside 
and outside the Union and address the importance of connectivity among these actors. The 
EU cannot place itself above other actors and exercise leadership in a top-down manner, but 
it can pursue a well-connected position within networks in a manner that enables it to shape 
events and influence others. The strategic use of networks can help the EU counter power 
politics and sustain rules-based order together with actors that share similar interests. 
The scale of global challenges requires the EU to adopt a selective approach to the task of 
preserving rules-based order. The grand rhetoric on global order needs to be translated into 
work on priority areas that are particularly vital for Europe (such as regional security) and 
where the EU has relatively strong influence (such as trade). Some of the priority areas are 
examined later in this report (section 3.4).  
3.3. Internal trends in the EU 
The EU’s unity and even its survival have been tested by a number of crises during the past 
decade. The rise of populist parties, the Eurozone crisis and migration crisis have contributed 
to political polarisation within and cleavages among member states. The EU has overcome 
these shocks and has taken a number of measures to cope with each crisis. Furthermore, it 
has introduced reforms aimed at improving its ability to handle similar challenges in the future. 
On the other hand, dissatisfaction in the political margins has grown and polarisation in-
creased. The measures taken to reform the Eurozone have been criticised by many experts 
as insufficient. The migration issue has proved to be even more difficult to tackle. 
The prevailing view in Europe is that the EU is needed more than ever to address these and 
other common challenges. A strong majority of EU citizens continue to support European 
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integration. Global instability plays a role in the EU’s internal cleavages, but it also necessi-
tates joint European responses.  
Political polarisation and Euroscepticism 
The rise of populism and authoritarianism is a global trend that has not left Europe untouched. 
External trends have been interwoven with internal crises within the EU, with a visible effect 
on the European political landscape. EU-related matters have become politicised to a stronger 
degree than in the past – in other words, they have become both more visible and more 
contested in national political debates. The Eurozone crisis in particular had a clear impact on 
public opinion: between 2007 and 2012, the EU’s image diminished while the popularity of 
Eurosceptic parties increased in many member states.215  
In Southern Europe, criticism towards the EU was above all levelled at austerity policies and 
economic hardship and translated into increased support for radical left-wing parties. In North-
ern parts of Europe, by contrast, Euroscepticism was mostly linked with the agenda of the 
populist radical right, including an anti-immigration and anti-globalisation stance. Further-
more, in many Eastern member states, there was also a notable surge in the populist radical 
right, although in these countries it did not oppose the EU as such but called for a stronger 
role for nation states within the Union.  
The populist parties, Eurosceptics and radical right make up diverse and only partly overlap-
ping groupings that lack a common agenda. The rise of the populist radical right in many 
member states, either in an anti-EU or merely EU-critical form, is a particular cause for con-
cern, as it poses a challenge to the core values that underpin both the national political sys-
tems and the integration project. The populist parties build their agenda on dividing society 
into two antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and claim to represent 
the will of the ‘ordinary people’.216 They tend to oppose not only the elite, but also liberalism, 
pluralism and cosmopolitanism.  
The Brexit vote of June 2016 was the most fateful expression of polarisation and the rise of 
Euroscepticism. Contrary to initial fears of contagion or a domino effect, it actually contributed 
to stronger unity among the EU27 and higher levels of public support for the EU.  
One of the most crucial tests of the popularity of the radical right was the French presidential 
election of 2017, in which the liberal pro-EU candidate Emmanuel Macron eventually beat the 
populist, nationalist, anti-EU contender, Marine Le Pen, with 66% of the vote. At the same 
time, populist right-wing parties have been in power in Hungary and Poland for several years, 
where they have gradually introduced restrictions on the rule of law and freedom of expres-
sion. These developments undermine the functioning of the rule of law in the EU as a whole, 
and pose a fundamental challenge to the EU’s external identity and credibility.217 A coalition 
of populist parties came to power in Italy in June 2018 and was soon on a collision course 
with the European Commission over budgetary rules. Furthermore, right-wing populists be-
long to coalition governments in Greece, Finland and Austria. 
The populists have had an impact on politics, especially at the national level, but far less at 
the EU level. Political fragmentation and polarisation have made governing more difficult, and 
it has become harder to put together effective government coalitions. Respect for political 
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adversaries has been replaced to some extent by fearmongering and hate-speech. Migration 
has gained a prominent place on the agenda, underscoring divisions within societies, even 
though the situation with regard to arrivals of new asylum-seekers stabilised in 2017–2018. 
The positions of many centre-right mainstream parties, and in some cases also the centre-
left, have moved closer to the populist radical right regarding migration issues and overall 
positioning vis-à-vis the EU.  
Mainstream parties have taken different approaches vis-à-vis the populist contenders. In 
some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, the radical right has been excluded from 
power. Such a ‘cordon sanitaire’ approach has its downsides: it can lead to weak or dysfunc-
tional governments, feed a sense of lack of alternatives among the electorate, and allow the 
populists to portray themselves as victims. The inclusion of the radical right in government 
may soften its positions, as happened in the case of Finland, with the result that the Finns 
Party split into two.218  
Populist and Eurosceptic parties have also been represented at the EU level, but their influ-
ence there has been limited. Decision-making in the European Parliament is largely domi-
nated by the two largest political groups, the European People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D). The populist parties have not formed a single group in the EP, but 
have been scattered among several mutually competing groups. If populists of different 
shapes make gains in the next European Parliament elections in 2019 and organise them-
selves more efficiently, their influence may increase, possibly even with a paralysing effect on 
EP decision-making. 
Economic crisis and reform of the Eurozone 
The global financial crisis reached Europe in 2008 and subsequently evolved into a crisis of 
the Eurozone. These developments exposed significant differences among the member 
states’ economies, notably with regard to competitiveness, productivity and financial sustain-
ability. The crisis was preceded by a period of high growth and a significant convergence of 
per capita income levels, due to particularly strong growth in the Eastern and Southern mem-
ber states. The financial crisis revealed that a substantial part of the convergence was unsus-
tainable. In many countries, increased spending was financed largely by growing debt, while 
cost competitiveness weakened. This led to exceptionally deep recessions.219 
The crisis involved a rapid increase in public debt, especially in the case of Greece. In addition 
to Greece, Ireland and Portugal were able to continue to serve their public debt and finance 
deficit only with the support of other member states (and the IMF). Spain and Cyprus also 
needed financial assistance. Furthermore, Italy was under considerable market pressure.220 
The assistance programmes involved harsh requirements to cut public expenditure, which 
came with painful social costs and political ramifications, such as increased distrust towards 
power holders, and the rise of Euroscepticism and populism. 
The crisis put a severe strain on the banking sector. In many cases, banks incurred heavy 
credit losses and had to be bailed out by governments in order to sustain the stability of the 
financial system. It became evident that the dependencies between financial institutions and 
sovereigns posed high risks to public economies and taxpayers.  
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This led to important political steps to create new stability mechanisms for extreme financial 
crises that endangered the Eurozone as a whole. EU institutions gained enhanced capacities 
to supervise and demand corrections to member states’ budgetary policies. The European 
Stability Mechanism established in 2012 was to provide a permanent solution by replacing 
the initial ad hoc rescue packages. The regulation and supervision of banks and other finan-
cial actors was tightened considerably through the creation of the Banking Union, which in-
cludes the Single Supervisory Mechanism, responsible for banking supervision, and the Sin-
gle Resolution Mechanism, dealing with problem banks.  
These measures meant a de facto increase in mutual responsibility and solidarity among Eu-
rozone members. At the same time, the issue of solidarity was a major dividing line between 
the northern and southern member states. Germany and other northern members empha-
sised national responsibility, conservative budgetary policies and more stringent control over 
compliance with agreed rules. Many southern member states, by contrast, prioritised the need 
to strengthen mechanisms of mutual solidarity and complement the monetary union with a 
political and fiscal union.221  
The need to bridge this division resulted in compromises and cautious reforms. The discus-
sions on Eurozone reform gained new momentum with the election of Emmanuel Macron as 
president of France in 2017. However, the North-South divide persisted, blocking any major 
steps towards institutional deepening or the introduction of new fiscal means. 
Insofar as deepening integration of the Eurozone did take place, it meant increased differen-
tiation within the EU. The Euro summits were institutionalised under a permanent presidency, 
and the Eurogroup practices were consolidated at the ministerial level. Further reforms have 
been envisaged in order to unify the external representation of the Eurogroup in the IMF. 
Ways to strengthen democratic control of the Eurozone in the framework of the European 
Parliament and through cooperation between the EP and national parliaments have also been 
discussed.222  
Possible more far-reaching reforms of the Eurozone would further increase differentiation be-
tween Eurozone members and non-members, posing a challenge to the EU’s unity. Hence, 
questions about maintaining the Union’s normative and institutional unity will have to be ad-
dressed in the context of further steps to strengthen the Eurozone. 
The migration crisis 
The number of people seeking international protection has increased worldwide due to con-
flicts and instability. The war in Syria has been the single most significant cause of increasing 
numbers of refugees arriving in the EU, but migration pressure is also high from several other 
countries of the wider Middle East and Africa. The causes of migration vary, but the focus in 
the context of the EU’s migration crisis has been on people applying for asylum. 
In 2015, an unprecedented number of asylum-seekers entered the EU, causing the so-called 
migration crisis.223 The large number of arrivals overwhelmed the established system of re-
ceiving and processing asylum applications. Furthermore, the refugee crisis exerted heavy 
pressure on the Schengen system, which allows free movement of people within most of the 
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EU without internal border controls. During the crisis, several Schengen countries reintro-
duced temporary border controls.224 
The migration flow was very unevenly distributed among the member states. The majority of 
migrants entering the EU did not stay in the country where they first arrived. Germany has 
been, by far, the most popular destination country, whereas some member states have re-
ceived almost no asylum applicants at all. 
The actual number of arrivals has only partly correlated with the political implications of the 
crisis, such as the salience of the issue on the national political agenda, the rise in popularity 
of the radical right, and positions on EU migration policy. The Visegrad countries, with the 
exception of Hungary, have received very small numbers of refugees, and yet the issue of 
migration has been prominent in their domestic politics, and the radical right-wing agenda has 
gained in popularity. 
All over the EU, the migration crisis has been one of the reasons behind the increased popu-
larity of radical right-wing parties in many member states. National immigration policies have 
been tightened in many countries, including Germany and the Nordic countries, which were 
initially more open.  
The tightening measures aimed at preventing migrants from entering the EU or staying there 
have been criticised by international organisations and civil society organisations for con-
travening human rights and international commitments. Hungary in particular has been ac-
cused of violating human rights with its dismal treatment of refugees. When Hungary became 
a major transit state in 2015, it launched a number of controversial measures to deter refugees 
from staying in the country, including government-funded anti-refugee campaigns stoking fear 
and hatred, preventing refugees from obtaining asylum, and minimising any help.225 
The EU’s responses can be broadly divided into external and internal measures. The Union 
has been fairly consensual and efficient when it comes to the external measures, and has 
focused on working with third countries for better control of migration flows through border, 
asylum and readmission policies. In particular, the EU-Turkey resettlement agreement con-
cluded in March 2016, combined with tighter border control, led to a considerable reduction 
in migration flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route. While politically effective, the Tur-
key deal is also problematic from the perspective of international law, similarly to several other 
measures taken by the EU and the member states in order to reduce migration. 
Another important measure has been the strengthening of the European Border and Coast 
Guard (EBCG). The EBCG has received stronger operational capabilities, a supervisory role 
over the national capacities of member states, and a stronger role in expulsions and readmis-
sion. In addition, an emergency mechanism has been introduced, which foresees the possi-
bility of intervention by the EBCG in a situation where a member state is unable to cope with 
controlling the EU’s external border. However, the intervention has to be approved by the 
member state in question.226 
Internally, the EU’s progress in developing a common approach has been far more limited. 
The development of a common asylum policy, including reform of the Common European 
Asylum System, has been hindered by deep cleavages between member states. In particular, 
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the issue of relocation schemes has been a major source of controversy among the member 
states. Countries that have received the largest numbers of asylum-seekers per capita, nota-
bly Germany and Sweden, as well as front states such as Italy and Greece, have been 
strongly promoting relocation in order to divide the burden more evenly among the member 
states. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have been fiercely against re-
location.227 Their opposition was, however, overturned in the Council, where the relocation 
plan was adopted without consensus.228 Thus, the East-West division within the EU resur-
faced strongly in the context of migration.  
3.4. The EU’s external relations and security 
The above-described external and internal challenges to the liberal order have had a visible 
impact on different areas of the EU’s external relations and security and defence policy. The 
EU needs to identify priority areas in its efforts to shape the global and regional order. The 
priority areas examined below are trade policy, security and defence policy, and relations with 
Russia, but this is by no means an exhaustive list. The chosen areas include one core field of 
EU competence, which has become globally more controversial (external trade) and two cru-
cial issues for Europe’s security (defence capabilities and relations with Russia). 
Trade policy 
Europe’s relative weight in the global economy is gradually declining. Yet for the time being, 
the EU’s unity in trade matters makes Europe a global heavyweight in this area. Trade policy 
is an area of the EU’s exclusive competence where the Commission has the leading role in 
developing and implementing common positions. Member states have delegated the task of 
negotiating trade agreements to the Union. EU trade policy has been strongly oriented to-
wards free trade and has developed in the framework of economic globalisation, regulated by 
institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank. 
In recent years, economic globalisation has faced a backlash from several directions, which 
has changed the ramifications of EU trade policy. First, there has been significant criticism 
inside Western societies (in both Europe and the US) against the negative implications of 
globalisation in areas such as job security and environmental standards. Second, the trade 
policy of the US has shifted under President Trump in the direction of protectionism, under-
mining multilateral rules and even taking steps towards trade wars. Third, the most important 
rising power and global contender vis-à-vis the US and the West, namely China, is undermin-
ing certain aspects of free trade with its own protectionist measures, although it also benefits 
from and wishes to maintain the stability and predictability provided by the existing global 
order.229 All in all, and for a number of reasons, the multilateral trading system based on the 
WTO has been facing serious challenges.  
The EU has sought to respond to the changing environment by defending and extending 
rules-based free trade, on the one hand, while taking measures to protect its citizens against 
the negative effects of globalisation, on the other. As formulated by President of the European 
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Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, “we are not naïve free traders”.230 Due to the difficulties 
faced by the multilateral framework, the EU has invested in a network of bilateral agreements.  
During 2017–2018, the EU stepped up negotiations on free trade agreements with a number 
of countries, including Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, the Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay) and Mexico. Increased global uncertainty caused by changes in US 
policy made the EU a more attractive negotiating partner and helped to speed up talks with a 
number of partners. The EU’s position as an economic giant and guardian of rules-based 
global trade is a significant asset. The new agreements allow the Union to counterbalance 
aggressive measures by the US and increase predictability. However, the EU’s relative weight 
is decreasing and the rise of protectionism is making the global environment less favourable 
for Europe. The current window of opportunity to move ahead swiftly with extending the net-
work of free trade agreements between the EU and its partner countries might not be open 
for long.231 
The failure of the TTIP agreement underscores changes in the global environment. Initially, 
the agreement was seen by both sides as a way to ensure that the EU and US would be able 
to shape the rules of global trade amidst the rise of China and uncertainty about its intentions. 
The agreement provided an opportunity to strengthen Europe’s position, which has been lost 
for the time being. On the other hand, the new inward-looking and at the same time aggressive 
approach of the US has helped to strengthen the EU’s attractiveness as a trading partner in 
the eyes of many other countries. 
At the same time, the EU’s trade policy has also shifted towards a slightly more protectionist 
mode. This shift is a reaction to both internal pressure from public opinion in Europe and 
external changes, most notably protectionist measures taken and/or threatened by other ma-
jor players starting from the US and China. Furthermore, Brexit changes the political balance 
in the Union and reduces the weight of member states with a strongly pro-free trade agenda 
such as Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. The influence of countries with 
a more protectionist agenda, notably France and some other Southern European member 
states, has grown.  
One of the biggest challenges for the EU is addressing the imbalance in its trade relationship 
with China. The latter imposes several restrictions on foreign companies wishing to enter the 
Chinese market, while the EU market is conversely very open, and the presence of Chinese 
companies in Europe has grown rapidly. This imbalance has placed the question of how to 
protect the European market high on the political agenda. The increasing Chinese presence 
raises questions not just about fair treatment of companies, but also about China’s geopolitical 
goals and implications for the rules-based order. 
Negotiations over the TTIP with the US and CETA with Canada exposed the increase in bot-
tom-up opposition to globalisation and free trade among EU citizens. Opponents of these 
agreements and of free trade more broadly still represent a minority; opinion polls indicate 
that the TTIP was supported by a majority of citizens.232 However, there is a broader concern 
about the negative implications of globalisation for job security, social equality, environmental 
and food standards. These issues have gained a visible place on the EU agenda (‘l’Europe 
qui Protège’). Human rights, work conditions and environmental protection are included on 
the agenda of free trade talks. In order to respond to critics and alleviate suspicions, the EU 
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has also increased the openness of its trade negotiations. All in all, EU trade policy has be-
come more focused on protecting European interests, while accommodating to the decline of 
multilateralism and universal values.  
Security and defence 
Since 2014, the EU has experienced a number of internal and external shocks, which have 
boosted efforts to strengthen common security and defence policy. The annexation of Crimea 
and the rise of ISIL in 2014 exposed the threats emanating from instability in the Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood. A couple of years later, the Brexit vote weakened the EU as a se-
curity actor, but at the same time removed some of the earlier obstacles to stronger defence 
cooperation in the EU framework. As the EU will lose its most significant military power due 
to Brexit, closer cooperation among the remaining member states becomes all the more nec-
essary in order to reduce fragmentation and put the existing resources to more effective use. 
Furthermore, Donald Trump’s election as president of the US introduced a period of unprec-
edented uncertainty over the transatlantic security arrangements, prompting Europeans not 
just to do more for their own defence but to actually “prepare to be left alone”.233  
During the 2000s, the EU’s security and defence policy concentrated almost exclusively on 
external crisis management. In recent years, the European debate has broadened from the 
CSDP to defence cooperation (the latter being broader than the CSDP), and from the man-
agement of external crises to protection of the Union, its member states and citizens.  
The shift began even before the shocks mentioned above. In December 2013, the European 
Council proposed measures for increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the 
CSDP; enhancing the development of capabilities; and strengthening the defence industry.234 
This agenda indicated a gradual move towards a more comprehensive view of European de-
fence and the EU’s role in it.235 The process also helped to establish the European Commis-
sion as a central player in the defence field, notably in matters related to the defence industry, 
market and research. 
Defence cooperation gained a prominent place in the implementation of the EU’s Global Strat-
egy. In November 2016, the Council agreed on a list of implementation proposals,236 and the 
Commission unveiled its Defence Action Plan.237 The Global Strategy lists three core tasks 
for the EU security and defence policy: responding to external conflicts and crises; building 
the capacities of partners; and protecting the Union and its citizens. 
The task of protecting the EU and its citizens is a significant new addition to the agenda. The 
practical meaning and content of this task is to be developed further. There is broad consen-
sus in the EU that, at least for the foreseeable future, the Union will not aim to take over 
NATO’s task of territorial defence. The terms of the debate have changed, however. Tradi-
tionally, the trans-Atlanticist EU member states, especially the UK and Baltic and Central Eu-
ropean countries, were suspicious about any move by the EU towards collective defence, 
fearing that this would undermine NATO and weaken the US commitment to European secu-
rity. On the other hand, some of the EU’s militarily non-allied countries, namely Ireland and 
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Austria, were concerned that extending the remit of the EU’s security and defence policy to 
‘defence proper’ would question the fundament of their defence policy solution.  
In recent years, the debate has focused on how the EU can and should contribute to Europe’s 
security and defence – not by taking over the core task of NATO, for which it lacks the nec-
essary capabilities and structures, but by complementing NATO in different ways. Coopera-
tion between the EU and NATO has experienced a sea change, from almost no cooperation 
at all to close political and practical ties.238 
So how does the EU contribute to protecting the Union and its citizens? First, the EU has 
introduced several new initiatives to advance practical defence cooperation among member 
states: 
• The Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is to provide a permanent 
mechanism to coordinate the procurement and capability development plans of the 
member states. The systematic exchange of information is designed to help member 
states identify joint needs and possible redundancies, as well as to initiate collabora-
tive projects.  
 
• The European Commission’s Defence Action Plan aims to create an open, integrated 
and effective European defence market and an integrated and competitive European 
defence industry. This is supported by the newly established European Defence Fund, 
consisting of two separate elements. First, the ‘research window’ funds collaborative 
research projects on innovative defence technologies. Second, the ‘capability window’ 
provides support for joint capability development projects conducted by the member 
states. 
 
• Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was introduced into the Lisbon Treaty 
as an instrument for deeper defence cooperation within a smaller group of member 
states. In December 2017, 25 member states agreed to join PESCO, which entails 
binding commitments to joint projects for developing defence capabilities and enhanc-
ing operational readiness. The participating member states also signed up to “regularly 
increasing defence budgets in real terms in order to reach agreed objectives”.239  The 
inclusion of almost all member states in PESCO resulted from a wish expressed by 
Germany in particular to prioritise the EU’s unity in security and defence matters. The 
inclusive nature of PESCO has raised doubts about its effectiveness, however. 
 
Second, the EU’s activities in crisis management and capacity-building, the ‘traditional’ sphere 
of the CSDP, contribute to the stability of Europe’s neighbourhood and thus indirectly to the 
protection of the EU and its citizens. CSDP operations and missions can also serve to guar-
antee stable access to global commons, as exemplified by the EU’s long-running anti-piracy 
operation off the coast of Somalia. The EU has established a Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability unit, which is an outcome of long discussions over a possible EU headquarters. 
However, the unit was not called a ‘headquarters’, and its tasks are limited to the planning 
and implementation of non-executive military missions, such as training missions. The EU’s 
role in responding to external conflicts continues to be limited due to a number of factors, such 
                                                     
238 European Union and NATO 2016. 
239 Council of the European Union 2017. 
  
 
48 
 
as a lack of political will and mutual trust, diverging strategic priorities, different strategic cul-
tures, and concrete questions related to the funding and planning of operations as well as 
missing capabilities. 
Third, the task of protecting the EU and its citizens also refers to EU activities ‘along the nexus 
of internal and external security’,240 involving actors such as the European Border and Coast 
Guard. The Sophia maritime operation in the Mediterranean provides one practical exam-
ple.241 The main task of this military CSDP operation is to combat people-smuggling in the 
Mediterranean and thereby contribute to the management of the EU’s external borders. 
Furthermore, member states agree that the EU can contribute to protecting Europe by coun-
tering hybrid threats. According to the EU’s own definition, hybrid threats represent a “mixture 
of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, 
military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or 
non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally 
declared warfare”.242 A number of EU policies contribute to important aspects of resilience, 
including energy, cyber, border and maritime security, thus being relevant for countering hy-
brid threats. However, linking these policies together from the viewpoint of hybrid security and 
resilience remains a challenge. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats operating in Helsinki is making an important contribution in this regard. 
Last but not least, the renewed focus on defence cooperation has revived discussion about 
the meaning of the mutual assistance clause (42.7 TEU). The French government’s request 
to activate Article 42.7 after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 serves as an 
important precedent. At the moment, Article 42.7 foresees action by the member states only, 
meaning that the exact form of assistance is to be agreed bilaterally between the country in 
need and each of its EU partners. There is scope for improving the EU’s readiness to imple-
ment the Article. This could involve defining a role for the EU institutions in the implementation 
process or the creation of other joint structures. In the context of the implementation of the 
EUGS, HR Mogherini suggested that the EU could explore how CSDP operations could con-
tribute to mutual defence under Article 42.7,243 but the Foreign Affairs Council watered down 
this proposal.244 
In addition to the activities undertaken in the EU framework, a number of smaller cooperation 
formats are ongoing among groups of member states. It is worth highlighting the French-led 
European Intervention Initiative (EII), launched in June 2018, which aims at more ambitious 
cooperation among a smaller group of countries willing and able to develop operational read-
iness and a shared strategic culture.245 The EII provides a way to engage Denmark and the 
UK, which do not participate in PESCO, in European defence cooperation. It is important to 
coordinate among the smaller groups and link them to the broader framework of the EU and 
NATO. 
The strategic goal of the above-described activities is to increase the EU’s strategic auton-
omy, and hence Europe’s capability to take care of its own security. While Europe has to 
prepare for being left alone, the commitment by the US to European security remains irre-
placeable for many years to come. In other words, maintaining a unique strategic partnership 
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with the US is necessary for European defence. Building a stronger, more capable EU can 
hopefully contribute to a more balanced transatlantic partnership in the future. 
Relations with Russia 
The EU’s relationship with Russia is one of the key issues for European security, especially 
for countries located close to the country. In 2014, EU-Russia relations shifted from cold to 
frosty due to the conflict in and over Ukraine. The sources of the conflict lie deeper, notably 
in incompatible understandings of the EU and Russia about the European security order and 
Russia’s status as a great power. The EU-Russia tensions serve as an example of the kind 
of instability that can arise from increased regionalisation or a multi-order world, where re-
gional centres of power lack a shared normative framework.246 
Russia’s strategic outlook stresses its aspiration to achieve the status of one of the great 
powers, motivated by a vision of a multipolar world order.247 Russia seeks to maximise its 
position in the competition between major powers, where the global dominance of the US and 
its allies constitutes the key obstacle to Russia’s goals. According to Russia’s security strat-
egy, the US and its allies seek to ‘contain Russia’ by exerting ‘political, economic, military and 
informational pressure on it’.248 The geographical scope of Russia’s strategic interests is 
mainly focused on the post-Soviet space and other immediate neighbours, but its aspiration 
for the status of a ‘leading power’ requires it to display force in other parts of the world as 
well.249  
The EU is not perceived by Russia as an independent global actor due to its dependence on 
the US for its own security. However, the EU has played an increasingly important role in the 
post-Soviet space, which has been a major source of tensions between the EU and Russia. 
The EU’s own understanding of its engagement in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Eastern 
neighbourhood stresses European norms and values. The core issue for the EU in the 
Ukraine conflict is to defend the existing European security order. 
The case of Ukraine is the most dramatic example of Russia’s efforts to impose its vision of 
Eurasian integration on a number of neighbouring countries, using a range of instruments 
including military force, economic pressure and extensive propaganda. In Ukraine, Russia 
violated the core principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, including 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders, and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. This inspired several Western commentators to declare the end of the 
post-Cold War or even the post-WWII order.250 The Western, including the EU, response to 
the violations in Ukraine succeeded in taking a principled position in defence of the existing 
order. At the same time, however, Western actors have failed to bring an end to the violations 
and restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova). The ongoing con-
flicts in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood cast a shadow over European security at large. 
The EU Global Strategy defines Russia as a ‘key strategic challenge’.251 Russia is by no 
means the only challenge to the liberal world order, but it is the only major actor actively and 
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aggressively seeking to revise the European security order. The EU has responded to Rus-
sia’s actions against Ukraine via sanctions as well as diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. 
The importance of the norms of territorial integrity and national self-determination has been a 
key issue in generating member states’ support for the sanctions.252 The EU has not been 
directly involved as an actor in the diplomatic process, however, but it has supported the 
participation of Germany and France, alongside Russia and Ukraine, in the ‘Normandy format’ 
that negotiated the Minsk II agreement. 
The Minsk agreements, although not negotiated or formally approved by the EU, gained a 
central place in the EU’s approach to the conflict through the linkage of sanctions to the im-
plementation of the agreements. Minsk II quelled the fighting and defined a set of measures 
to be taken towards settlement, but it has been subject to conflicting interpretations by the 
different sides. Expectations with regard to the implementation of the agreements have gen-
erally been low, although they have become the main reference point in the diplomatic pro-
cess.  
The Ukraine crisis has exposed the limits of the EU’s ability to engage in conflict resolution in 
a situation where member states’ positions differ considerably, while the stakes are high. The 
limitations of EU diplomacy have also been evident in the case of Syria, where the Union has 
failed to make a notable contribution to the settlement process. Hence, the Union has been 
rather helpless with regard to the two most critical and bloody conflicts in its neighbourhood, 
Syria and Ukraine. Both conflicts have served as reminders of the relevance of military power 
in international relations, showing the gains, even if only short-term, of considerable use of 
force in a conflict situation. Russia, relying on its military force and other instruments, has 
been the key actor in Ukraine and has become one of the key players in Syria more recently. 
As noted above, the EU’s transformative agenda has run into difficulties more broadly in re-
cent years, while the Union has become preoccupied with protecting itself rather than shaping 
its environment. However, in the context of the Ukraine conflict, the EU has stepped up its 
support for domestic reforms in Ukraine.253 The success of the reforms is crucial for Ukraine’s 
ability to maintain domestic stability and to withstand Russia’s aggression. The results have 
been mixed and fragile, as the old corrupt and oligarchic system has proved quite resilient.254 
Again, there is more than Ukraine at stake: this case is seen to provide a strong example for 
other countries in the post-Soviet space, including Russia. The Kremlin has viewed the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in the post-Soviet countries with great suspicion, if not paranoia, and has devel-
oped a set of counter-measures.255 The EU’s support for reforms is thus more than a techno-
cratic exercise; it has major political and geostrategic implications, which the EU was unpre-
pared to address when launching the Eastern Partnership policy in 2009.  
In spite of the high level of tensions, the EU and member states continue to seek positive 
engagement and cooperation with Russia in areas where common interests can be identi-
fied.256 Economic interaction remains high; the impact of sanctions on trade has been limited. 
The fight against terrorism appears to be a natural shared interest, highlighted in the security 
strategies of both sides. Cooperation in this field was pursued strongly by France in particular, 
following the attacks in Paris in January and November 2015. However, hopes of mutually 
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beneficial cooperation were soon dashed by Russia’s military actions in Syria, which con-
flicted with the EU and French positions.257 
The above-described aspects of the EU’s approach to Russia are brought together in the five 
guiding principles agreed in March 2016: the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 
strengthening relations with the EU’s Eastern Partners, strengthening the resilience of the 
EU, selective engagement with Russia, and fostering people-to-people contacts.258 These 
principles embrace both hard-line views, which emphasise the first points, and more Russia-
friendly voices within the EU, which call for active efforts to increase engagement and dia-
logue. In the foreseeable future, however, the unresolved security issues remain a major ob-
stacle to normalisation of EU-Russia relations. The tensions boil down to the clash between 
the EU’s emphasis on a rules-based global order and multilateralism, and Russia’s aspirations 
for a great-power status in a multipolar world. 
3.5. Chapter conclusions 
A rules-based order and multilateralism remain at the core of the EU’s worldview, but major 
players such as China, Russia and most notably the US display at best selective commitment 
to international norms and institutions. The EU’s ability to preserve the rules-based interna-
tional order is of key importance for Europe’s security, wellbeing and global influence in the 
future. The global context highlights the need for European unity.  
The external challenges are interwoven with internal ones. The rise of populism, the financial 
and economic crisis, and the migration crisis are all part of broader global developments. 
These crises have posed major tests for the EU’s unity over the past decade. The internal 
dividing lines have appeared dramatic during the 2010s, but the EU has shown considerable 
resilience and ability to cope with internal divisions.  
Power is not only being re-distributed among major states, but it is also transferring beyond 
the state, to transnational networks of a variety of non-state actors. The diffusion of power 
beyond the state is a trend that the EU might be well placed to accommodate and utilise, both 
internally and externally. This requires consistent efforts. In order to protect its interests and 
values in the unstable global context, the EU needs to work with like-minded partners among 
smaller and medium-sized states across the world, non-state actors and civil society. 
The EU also needs to define priority areas that are particularly important with a view to pre-
serving and shaping the international rules-based order. This report has explored some issues 
where the EU can and should make a difference. 
Trade policy is an area where the EU has relatively strong international influence and where 
it is actively defending and shaping the rules-based order. However, the EU’s relative weight 
in the global economy is slowly weakening. Europe needs to advance swiftly with regard to 
strengthening its network of free trade agreements across the globe, in order to mitigate the 
effects of aggressive US trade policy and the rise of China. 
In the field of security and defence, the EU is responding to the increased relevance of power 
politics, great-power competition and unprecedented uncertainty about the transatlantic alli-
ance by stepping up its efforts to strengthen European capabilities and defence cooperation. 
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This is a slow process, with Europe’s strategic autonomy as a distant goal. Meanwhile, the 
EU is developing close cooperation with NATO and has little choice but to try to preserve its 
unique partnership with the US. Europe will remain relatively weak in military terms for years 
to come. It is therefore crucial to work on constraining the use of force in international relations 
via multilateral cooperation, diplomacy and conflict resolution. 
The EU’s relationship with Russia is framed by principled differences between the two sides’ 
understandings of the European security order, which are unlikely to be resolved in the short 
term. These disagreements are most strongly displayed in the conflict in and around Ukraine, 
but are also visible in Russia’s policies vis-à-vis the EU and its member states. Nonetheless, 
the EU continues to pursue cooperation in areas where shared interests can be identified. 
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4. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:    
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINLAND 
4.1. Introduction 
The main conclusions to be drawn from this study thus far emphasise the fundamental char-
acter of the ongoing transition of the international system. The most visible change is un-
doubtedly the weakening of the Western dominance over this system, which is reflected both 
in the global balance of power and in the structures of global governance with its norms and 
institutions. 
The reasons for this change are varied, however, and are not only linked to the declining role 
of the US as the post-Cold War hegemonic power. There is strengthened rivalry between 
values globally, causing a re-definition of what is at stake and, consequently, constructing 
new dividing lines in global politics. These new dividing lines revolve around social, economic 
and environmental issues as well as issues of identity and human security, and have far-
reaching consequences, not only for the balance of power between states but also within 
states. Moreover, they are tightly connected to the emergence of new actors and new coali-
tions among the existing ones. Actors as different as religious communities and large multi-
lateral enterprises are empowered by, and capitalise on, the emerging dividing lines between 
conservative and liberal values at the global level, allying themselves both with governments 
and with non-state actors that share their values. The key constituents of state power such 
as sovereignty and nationalist tenets form another dividing line, pitting nationalist political 
forces against liberals and numerous forms of civil society actors. 
The way in which the dividing lines of world politics extend beyond states also captures the 
phenomenon of the diffusion of state power, which plays a key role in the global transfor-
mation, as emphasised in this report. The key longer-term trend in world politics, where con-
flicts no longer revolve exclusively or even primarily around strategic commodities, such as 
territory, or other material resources, such as energy, but increasingly around values and 
identities also affects the structure of actors and constantly fuels the emergence of new play-
ers in the global arena. The latter range from key economic actors to terrorist organisations, 
as well as different non-governmental organisations focusing on value issues. 
In light of the changing constellation of actors and the new sources of conflict in world politics, 
the concept of power has to be understood in a broader sense. In the study of international 
relations, power that has mostly been approached as an attribute of the state to be measured 
in terms of economic, political and military capabilities has to be seen as a more multifaceted 
phenomenon to better capture its dynamic nature in an environment with multiple actors and 
political dividing lines. Apart from working in social interaction, power also has to be ap-
proached as a discursive practice working in social construction. This study provides exam-
ples of how different formal and informal rules and norms empower new actors and affect 
their interests and identities. The set-up in global climate policy, for instance, was shown to 
empower cities or regions and sometimes pit them against their own governments. 
The decline of US hegemony and the emergence of a multipolar world thus represents only 
one part of a broader transition of power, which involves a much larger set of dividing lines 
and actors. However, as the leading actors with respect to territoriality and military force, and 
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in the key formal structures of international governance and law, states still matter, and the 
change in the balance of power between states was also well documented in this report. The 
report shows how the Chinese power potential has been constantly growing, with its ambitions 
turning global and Chinese interests being identified all over the world. A characteristic of the 
current Chinese great-power policy is its willingness to increasingly balance its rivalries, be it 
by allying itself with Russia to challenge the US or by seeking to establish relationships with 
smaller groups of EU members to weaken the unity of the EU. This study also confirms the 
assumption according to which the Chinese willingness to support the current Western-led 
system of global governance is becoming compartmentalised. China supports those norma-
tive frameworks that are compatible with its own values and interests, while challenging oth-
ers. Whilst China shows more responsibility for the common global agenda than Russia, and 
asserts an identity of a responsible great power, these two rivals of the Western-led order are 
unified through common vulnerabilities related to their authoritarian political system. This 
places limitations on their international engagement, as they have to constantly protect them-
selves against Western values to ensure regime survival. 
One common outcome of all of the ongoing transitions is the weakening of the universal char-
acter of the international order and its norms and institutions. In the face of a more diverse 
set of actors and the changing balance of power between states, an international order of a 
universal nature becomes increasingly difficult to achieve and uphold. This study, like many 
other studies,259 suggests that one consequence is most likely a gradual move towards re-
gional orders revolving around regional systems of power and regional institutions. The nature 
and strength of these regional orders, and their relationship to each other and to global insti-
tutions, will therefore be crucial determinants of the shape and stability of the future interna-
tional order.260 
In practice, the character of the regional orders is likely to vary widely from one region to 
another. Most (although not all) regional orders in the world are likely to be decisively shaped 
by – or built around – a leading regional power, whose approach towards its respective region 
and the world at large is therefore of key importance. At best, regional orders are founded on 
(largely) shared interests, mutually acceptable rules and inclusive decision-making structures. 
However, regional orders can also be forged through coercion and with the sole aim of serving 
the interests of the leading regional power.261 Mutually beneficial and broadly supported re-
gional orders can make a contribution to global governance, promoting multilateralism both 
within and beyond their respective regions. However, the growing importance of regional or-
ders can also result in further fragmentation of the international system, increasing regional 
divergence as well as political and economic competition between the individual regions and 
their leading powers.262 Especially the borderlines between different regional orders face the 
risk of being exposed to tension and conflicts. If the trend towards a system of regional orders 
were to accelerate, it would be of the utmost importance to be able to define the key fields of 
international cooperation where universal governance and rules will still prevail. These would 
need to include, but not be limited to, matters of peace and security, the management of 
global commons and the fight against climate change. 
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When it comes to the role of the EU, this study shows that the Union has its obvious strengths 
and weaknesses in facing the comprehensive global transformation. Due to its own hybrid 
character, the EU is more flexible than state actors in coping with an environment shaped by 
new political dividing lines and multiple actors. Being a multilayered actor itself, the EU can 
more easily reach out to non-state actors and create coalitions or cooperation on issues of 
common interest. The key shortcomings of the EU were firstly found to be related to how its 
own values are being challenged as the cornerstones of the international order. The different 
takes of the EU and the United States on values and the future of the international order is 
what increasingly separates the EU from its key international ally across the Atlantic. At the 
same time, the EU’s core values have been called into question at home as well, bringing 
about significant divisions both within and between the EU’s member states, and thereby 
challenging the Union’s unity and coherence as a political community and actor. 
Secondly, the strengthening of great-power politics has constrained the EU’s external policies, 
as the use of military force and increasing geopolitical rivalry have emphasised the EU’s tra-
ditional weaknesses. These weaknesses can be seen to stem from the Union’s hybrid political 
identity, which vacillates between a state identity and an identity constructed on the notion of 
being different from a state. This study highlights how most of the recent crises that the EU 
has faced have brought questions about the Union’s identity to the fore, demanding it to find 
political solutions to disputes over the extent and forms of mutual solidarity, or the lack of 
respect for common values.   
The EU has consequently been forced to respond to the changing global environment by 
prioritising its own survival: by safeguarding the key pillars of European integration and its 
own internal unity. Its possibilities to advance its core values internationally have become 
much more limited, as these values have become increasingly controversial in many parts of 
the world. Indeed, the rise of great-power politics has led to a confrontation over these values 
with Russia and China, but also increasingly with the US, as exemplified by the case of the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran.  
Against the backdrop of the forms of global transition described above, it is likely that the EU 
will have to continue along this path of protecting its own system and security, which by ne-
cessity means deepening the integration and enlarging the competences of the EU in critical 
policy fields. In many of these policy fields, this process has already been initiated with the 
aim of strengthening the Union’s values and integrity. Examples can be found in the EMU and 
the efforts to deepen it within the realm of economic and fiscal policies, in various fields of 
internal and external security ranging from border security policies to defence cooperation 
and, lastly, in energy cooperation that seeks to decrease the Union’s energy dependence. 
The EU’s main response to a more challenging external environment is duly taking the Union 
in a more state-like, centralised direction. This trend, however, is likely to face difficulties and 
generate resistance in several member states. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of differenti-
ated integration, which the pressures towards deepening were generally assumed to fuel, has 
stayed within clear limits. Thus far, and irrespective of the significant dividing lines on key 
values that have emerged between EU member states, the EU has not faced major risks of 
more far-reaching divisions, which would affect its institutional and legal unity. By far the most 
serious case of disintegration to date, Brexit, has served to strengthen the unity of the remain-
ing 27 member states, rather than serve as an example to political forces elsewhere in Europe 
to follow suit. 
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All in all, it can be argued that the selfsame challenges that weaken the EU’s values and 
power in the international context constrain its action internally. The EU is therefore in a highly 
vulnerable position in navigating between these challenges. At the same time, greater aware-
ness of the EU’s importance has started to emerge in its member states and among EU citi-
zens. 
4.2. What are the implications for Finland and its international 
position? 
This report has thus far progressed from the global level to the regional one, highlighting the 
major global shifts and explaining how they manifest themselves at the regional level and, 
above all, in the internal dynamics and external action of the EU. This section, for its part, 
turns the focus onto Finland and aims to clarify what the global and regional shifts look like 
from Finland’s point of view. The analysis covers Finland’s whole operating area, which ex-
tends from the country’s immediate strategic environment (most notably the Baltic Sea region, 
but increasingly the Arctic as well) to the EU and the broader European space, all the way up 
to the existing and emerging sites of global governance. As in the report as a whole, any 
analytical distinctions made between the different ‘levels’ of Finland’s operating environment 
– and the causal relationships established between them – should be treated with caution, as 
they often remain arbitrary. 
Finland, as a small state in terms of population size, economic weight and military capabilities, 
has decidedly benefited from the Western-dominated and US-led rules-based international 
order and its European manifestation, the post-Cold War European security order, with the 
EU and NATO at its heart. This order has helped to create the conditions under which Finland 
has been able to thrive as a liberal democracy and an open economy. However, the changes 
in the international system described in this report will profoundly affect and alter the environ-
ment within which Finland pursues its economic, political and security objectives. 
The implications of these changes for Finland, as for any state, are hard to gauge with any 
degree of certainty. It is also clear that they will be both complex and multi-faceted. They will 
reach Finland through multiple channels and unfold in various ways and to varying degrees 
in different policy areas and at the different ‘levels’ of Finland’s operating environment, ranging 
from its immediate surroundings to the broader areas in which it has an interest and presence, 
either as a state, as a member of the EU, or some other community or organisation. 
First, a changing global balance of power will affect Finland’s immediate strategic environment 
in various ways. A weakening of the Western-led international order and its rules will put 
growing emphasis on the role of great powers and leading regional actors. The changing 
global power structure is already reflected in the reduced possibilities and willingness of the 
US to invest in European security, as an increasingly assertive and powerful China draws US 
attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, the long predicted and purported US ‘pivot’ to Asia 
is no longer a strategic choice but more of a strategic necessity, as the US increasingly rec-
ognises China as a peer competitor. 
This change of US policy has been, and will continue to be, maximally utilised by Russia, 
which has emerged as a major challenger of the Western-dominated rules-based system, 
both globally and especially in Europe, where its actions and rhetoric have specifically tar-
geted the security order. This has been most evident with regard to Russia’s role in the conflict 
  
 
57 
 
in and around Ukraine, but has also reverberated in the Baltic Sea region, which has seen a 
clear rise in political tensions and military activity.  
Russia’s room for manoeuvre in its neighbourhood, including the Baltic Sea region and Eu-
rope as a whole, will certainly grow if the world, as hinted in this report, moves towards re-
gional systems of power. Europe’s current security order is, in many ways, an extension of 
the liberal world order, guaranteed through the long-standing US commitment to defending it 
both politically and militarily. However, the simultaneous weakening of the international rules-
based order globally, and the growing reluctance of the US to stand up for this order in Europe, 
suggest that Europe may indeed become a more isolated space. As a result, the European 
security order would increasingly be built around the European Union, while the boundaries 
of this order would be managed in interaction (that is, cooperation and, potentially, conflict) 
with the other leading regional actor of the European continent, Russia, which aims at creating 
and maintaining a regional order of its own. 
At a global level, a world order in which the acceptance and scope of international norms and 
rules becomes more limited – and in which they may eventually be replaced by “minimal rules 
of coexistence between great powers with different political visions”263 – also certainly comes 
closer to meeting Russia’s longer-term strategic aims, providing it with ever greater freedom 
of action and corresponding with its minimalist reading of international law and cooperation. 
China’s role in the emerging European security order is also important, but for the most part 
indirect. China shapes the European order in two ways: firstly, it does so by affecting the US 
strategic approach and US engagement in Europe and, secondly, by influencing the Russian 
room for manoeuvre. Thus far, the Sino-Russian political dynamics and the deepened bilat-
eral cooperation between the two countries have strengthened Russia’s possibilities to assert 
its powers in its European neighbourhood, with China remaining conspicuously silent about 
the Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, the different approaches of the two great pow-
ers towards the international order at large might create constraints for Russia in the long run. 
China undoubtedly has the upper hand in the Sino-Russian cooperation and will be able to 
exert an influence on Russia’s international action. If this action were to challenge key Chi-
nese interests with regard to economic stability for instance, China would be likely to try to 
change the Russian course. 
For Finland, the prospect of a move towards an international system based on regional sys-
tems of power and order entails certain obvious risks, especially due to Finland’s geographic 
location at the intersection of two potentially competing regional orders, that of the European 
Union and that of Russia. If the world moves towards tightening geopolitical competition be-
tween the emerging regional orders, it will become increasingly important from Finland’s – or 
any small state’s – point of view to universally consolidate the role of the key international 
norms regulating the use of force and confirming the inviolability of the territorial integrity of 
states and their borders. In an international system largely based on regional systems of 
power and order, stability can be safeguarded only by agreeing on a set of norms that is non-
negotiable, and that serves the core interests of any human communities.264 
In view of the arguments presented in this report, it is likely that the US role in European 
security will be more limited in the future. This puts increasing pressure on the members of 
the European Union and/or NATO. The European Union has in recent years struggled with 
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the growing geopolitical competition (and the prospect thereof), both within and beyond Eu-
rope. At the same time, the developments and trends both globally and in Europe have led to 
more serious attempts by the EU to adapt both its strategic outlook and its instruments to the 
challenges posed by the more complex and competitive regional and global setting. 
Partnerships will be crucially important for the EU in this new environment. The Union will 
need like-minded states and non-state actors alike as partners to defend and uphold its ideals 
of multilateral cooperation and a rules-based order, be it in the framework of existing interna-
tional organisations or, if need be, in smaller constellations. At the same time, partnerships 
will continue to be essential for the EU in the military realm as well, as the Union’s develop-
ment as a (more) strategically autonomous security and defence actor is a medium- to long-
term objective at best. As argued in this report, in terms of security and defence, the EU will 
have little choice but to try to maintain its unique and currently fragile partnership with the US, 
which will be more difficult due to the shifting US focus. Here, the EU’s character as a multi-
level actor might, however, be helpful, as different networks (bilateral, minilateral or multilat-
eral) may provide the opportunity to tie the US into European security in a more flexible and 
resource-saving manner, which seems more feasible in an era when the main interests and 
challenges of the US lie outside Europe. Networks may also provide a way to organise the 
post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the UK, whose future relationship with the 
EU seems to be very much in the air at the time of writing. At the same time, the EU could 
ideally play a crucial role as a political hub, coordinating Europe’s multifaceted security and 
defence platforms and cooperation formats. 
If the world moves towards increasing great-power rivalry, (competing) regional orders as well 
as a more fragmented and issue-based take on global governance, Finland’s international 
role will be increasingly dependent on its ability to ally itself with like-minded actors, be they 
state or non-state actors. The EU is by far the most important community of values for Finland 
and will play an important role in softening the effects of the global transition and providing 
stability. The Union will be of crucial importance for Finland in economic, political and security 
terms, forming a bulwark against the global uncertainties. The Union and its member states 
will continue to be Finland’s key reference group within the international organisations of 
which they are all members. Moreover, the EU is Finland’s most important channel for having 
a say in the more complex and contested global political arena in both existing and emerging 
sites of global governance. However, this does not mean that the EU in its current state would 
be particularly well placed to face the changing international environment or to respond to the 
needs emerging from the tightening global competition. Instead, as this report indicates, the 
EU as an actor is grappling with many aspects of the global shifts that profoundly challenge 
its worldview, which is firmly rooted in the primacy of multilateralism, international rules and 
universal values. Moreover, the EU as a political community is cross-cut by several deep 
divisions that run between different groups of member states as well as within European so-
cieties themselves.  
As a consequence, it is essential for Finland to realise that in order to have the kind of EU 
that is able to cope with the changes taking place in all key spheres of its international envi-
ronment, Finland will need to actively work towards creating (and maintaining) that Union. In 
this regard, four objectives appear to be of utmost importance:  
1. to safeguard and, if possible, strengthen the unity of the EU as a political community;  
2. to protect liberal democracy and the rule of law within the Union itself;  
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3. to enhance the EU as an international actor by developing both its foreign policy component 
and its security and defence capabilities, as well as its other main instruments of external 
action, and 
4. to ensure that the EU maintains its commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based inter-
national order by actively promoting them and their value together with other like-minded ac-
tors (state and non-state alike). 
At best, these objectives can be mutually reinforcing, but there is also the possibility that one 
will have to prioritise, or even choose between them, at least in the short or medium term. 
There may, for example, be inevitable trade-offs between maintaining unity and advancing 
the integration process in key policy fields or, in a similar vein, between maintaining unity and 
fighting against potential breaches of the EU’s values and rules within the community itself, 
as exemplified by the cleavages that have already emerged between Hungary and Poland on 
the one hand, and most of the other EU member states on the other. Thus, Finland may have 
to set its priorities on a case-by-case basis, depending on the situation at hand. 
Safeguarding and strengthening the unity of the EU as a political community 
based on liberal democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
As far as the EU’s unity is concerned, it has been under strain due to the different crises that 
the Union has faced in recent years, as well as the divisions within European societies, which 
have created a fertile breeding ground for populist and Eurosceptic forces. Moreover, external 
actors – Russia and China in particular, but most recently even the US – have tried to weaken 
the EU’s unity or take advantage of the existing or potential divisions within the Union. While 
the Brexit process represents the most concrete example of disintegration, fragmentation and 
disunity within the EU, it has also turned unity into a key objective among the remaining mem-
ber states. At the time of writing, unity seems to have prevailed over the ambitions to advance 
the integration process through means of differentiated integration.  
However, within the EMU, deepening has already progressed relatively far, acquiring an in-
creasingly institutionalised character. For Finland, this presents the challenge of positioning 
itself on a different side of the institutional divide compared to one of its most important part-
ners, Sweden. Thus far, Finland has therefore sought to emphasise that the EMU needs to 
be developed in an inclusive manner. This strategy seems apt also for the future and is cur-
rently being emphasised by the tightening cooperation between several small and mid-sized 
member states from both within and outside the Eurozone – the so-called New Hanseatic 
League – on  questions related to the EMU.  
The cooperation within this group of states points to another key trend affecting the EU, 
namely the increasing importance of minilateral formats, which has been particularly notable 
in view of Brexit.265 In terms of the unity and coherence of the EU, this trend has both positive 
and negative potential. On the one hand, minilateral groups can offer new impulses for the 
EU agenda, make it easier to reach agreements by aggregating member states’ interests and 
giving small and mid-sized member states, like Finland, a stronger say.266 On the other hand, 
they can also breed feelings of disunity, exclusion and marginalisation, and strengthen the 
use of informal decision-making processes within the EU, which is traditionally not in the in-
terests of smaller member states like Finland. Moreover, informal groups can be strategically 
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used by external actors to create divisions within the EU.267 Hence, while it is beneficial for 
Finland to strengthen EU-related coordination with its Nordic and Baltic partners, Finland 
would do well, by and large, to continue its long-term approach of letting the issue in question 
define its main partners and preferred coalition.268 This way, Finland would build bridges 
across the EU and contribute to its unity. Such a strategy would also prove beneficial for 
Finland in an EU in which it is increasingly likely that the core group of member states varies 
from one policy area to another.269 Furthermore, it would allow for the involvement of influen-
tial non-state actors in the policy process, where necessary or useful.   
The more the EU’s core values become challenged globally, the more vulnerable these values 
become also within the EU itself. Safeguarding these values and consolidating them further 
via the systems of both law and politics will therefore be a necessary precondition for the 
Union’s internal legitimacy and external power. Finland consequently has every reason to 
continue with its consistent policy of supporting – and demanding support for – the corner-
stones of the Union’s legal and political order. From the perspective of a small member state, 
the objective and impartial case-by-case application of this order has formed one of the key 
justifications for the extension and execution of supranational powers, and there is hardly any 
change in sight concerning the legitimacy and rationale of this approach.  
Enhancing the EU as an international actor and its commitment to a rules-
based international order 
As far as the EU’s international role is concerned, Finland has strongly supported most 
measures taken by the Union to enhance its foreign, security and defence policy capabilities 
and actorness. Unlike most other member states, Finland has also consistently underlined 
the role of the EU member states’ mutual security and defence commitments in the form of 
the mutual assistance clause and the solidarity clause. Nevertheless, in terms of security, 
Finland has relied not only, or even mainly, on the EU, but on a broad network of relationships, 
including intensified cooperation with Sweden, a close partnership with NATO, closer coop-
eration with the US both bilaterally and together with Sweden, as well as other mini- and 
multilateral formats. Moreover, Finland, alongside many other member states, has sought to 
advance cooperation between the EU and NATO. As argued earlier, these networks will con-
tinue to be of great importance and could also help to tie Europe’s indispensable partner, the 
US, to European defence, at least for now. However, as emphasised, the main strategic in-
terests of the US already lie outside Europe, and the US is likely to increase its engagement 
in Asia-Pacific at the expense of its European commitments. This is a long-term trend to which 
Finland, alongside other EU/NATO members, will have to adapt. This development also em-
phasises the importance of European solutions regardless of the framework in question. 
Apart from its security and defence policy capabilities, the EU should also invest more in its 
foreign policy component, which has often suffered from the EU member states’ inability and 
unwillingness to align their positions and work toward common objectives. In order to address 
these traditional shortcomings, proposals to extend the use of qualified majority voting in the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy have been put forward recently, but this is unlikely 
to take place in the short or medium term.270 Instead, it is possible that the EU will simply 
move towards more flexibility in its foreign and security policy-making, allowing bigger or 
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smaller groups of member states to speak and act either formally or informally on behalf of 
the EU.271 From Finland’s point of view, such a development entails concerns and risks, as it 
will put emphasis on informal decision-making, and is likely to underline the role of the biggest 
and most capable member states. However, as institutional innovations or the emergence of 
a more strategically unified EU seem unlikely at the moment, Finland may have little choice 
but to accept the increasing flexibility, as long as it can be effected in a way that increases 
the EU’s possibilities to shape and react to individual foreign policy issues, and avoids creat-
ing significant divides within the EU. Finland should, however, try to work towards making the 
decision-making processes as inclusive as possible. 
Trade policy is the area of external action where the EU currently seems to have the greatest 
potential and power. However, due to the difficulties the global trade regime is facing, the 
emphasis in this policy area has mostly shifted towards free trade agreements with individual 
partners. Apart from trade-related questions, these give the EU a potentially powerful possi-
bility to advance a broad agenda of different global issues, including key issues related to 
climate, environmental protection, human rights and labour standards. However, using trade 
agreements as a geographically limited alternative to global governance incurs significant 
risks, as it renders the negotiations increasingly complex and lengthy. This is not in the EU’s 
interests, as its declining share of the global economy and trade, and the current protectionist 
tendencies in the global economy suggest that the EU needs to act rather swiftly. Thus, the 
EU will have to strike a balance between its different, and at times competing, objectives. 
While Finland as an open economy benefits from expanding the EU’s network of free trade 
agreements, the Finnish economy is also highly dependent on both China and the US,272 with 
whom any comprehensive free trade agreements seem unlikely at the moment. Therefore, it 
would be in Finland’s interests if the EU were able to breathe new life into the global trade 
regime. 
The idea of a rules-based international order is a quintessential part of the EU. The Union’s 
success as an international actor therefore depends on the strength of this rules-based order 
in the broader global context. The more the power of might dominates on the international 
stage, with elements linked to politico-military power gaining the upper hand, the more vul-
nerable the EU becomes both internally and externally. Hence, it is also in Finland’s interests 
to use the EU’s potential to promote an international order based on rules rather than on a 
politico-military balance of power. If the scope of such an order is narrowing, as anticipated in 
this report, the EU’s efforts should be concentrated on those fields of global politics where the 
existence of universal rules and global governance are of most importance. This applies 
above all to the prevention of conflicts and consolidation of peace and security as well as the 
fight against climate change. 
4.3. Finland’s international strategy in a new environment 
In conclusion, it seems that Finland will have to get used to a new and once again more 
demanding international environment. While it is impossible to predict the exact shape that 
the international order will take, the major transitions analysed in this report suggest that 
global politics will be both more complex and more competitive. Even if parts of the liberal 
international order may prove surprisingly resilient, a return to the kind of Western-led rules-
based order that has characterised the post-Cold War era is not on the cards. Particularly for 
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a small state like Finland, the ongoing changes in the international order and the resulting 
uncertainties are a cause for concern. However, this time Finland is not alone, but faces the 
new situation as a part of an EU that is characterised by deep interdependencies between its 
members. It is in Finland’s interests to further strengthen these interdependencies and con-
tribute to the resilience and vitality of the EU. It is equally in its interests to enhance the EU’s 
ability to take advantage of its own hybrid character by looking for partners among the wide 
group of state and non-state actors in order to strengthen its power in the policy fields most 
important for it. 
Finland should also be prepared for the possibility of the political situation around its borders 
becoming even more complicated, if the weakening of the rules-based order advances fast 
and the world moves towards competing regional orders. This implies that the current con-
frontation between the EU and Russia will be of a more long-standing character and may 
even be aggravated as the common normative framework between them becomes narrower. 
Apart from the EU’s unity, cooperation with like-minded countries is key in such a situation, 
together with the clarification of Finland’s own international role and values. It goes without 
saying that Finland’s location in the interface between two regional orders stresses its need 
to ensure the existence of, and full respect for, at least a minimal level of common rules safe-
guarding the co-existence of the orders. 
Finally, Finland should make efforts to contribute to decreasing the dividing lines and conflict 
potential between great powers, or the regional orders, making use of the multifaceted struc-
ture of actors in world politics. To this end, Finland should also look for possible partners 
among non-state actors worldwide and contribute to the establishment of networks of like-
minded actors in the various issue areas of global politics. If done successfully, this could 
strengthen positive interdependencies and facilitate the construction of a common agenda 
among state actors as well. 
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